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ABSTRACT  
ENERGY SECURITY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY: HARMONY 
OR DISCORD: A CRITICAL GAME OF MUTUAL BENEFITS 
 
ECE ÇAM 
M.A in Political Science Program, Thesis, 2013 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Muftuler Bac 
 
Keywords: European Union, Energy Security, the Role of Turkey, Intergovernmentalism, 
Turkish Membership, Russia, Pipelines, Energy Routes, Central Eastern European Countries 
 
The issue of energy plays a critical role for energy-rich and energy-dependent countries in 
today’s international political system. Countries like Russia have an abundance of energy 
resources, and this situation has resulted in European energy-dependent countries being cast 
into a critical position. As a result, energy security debates within the EU have increased 
dramatically and have caused countries to focus on the security of energy resources. 
Increasing energy demands and decreasing domestic production places the EU in a very 
difficult position. In order to lessen the dependency on Russia for energy resources, the EU 
and member states have had to seek alternative energy resources and energy routes. Given 
this reality, the role of Turkey in EU energy security has become very critical, as Turkey is a 
geographically bridge linking energy resources and the EU. Furthermore, it can be a fourth 
artery for the EU and Turkey can take advantage of this role as it applies for EU membership. 
However, the EU is not a unified body, and member states have different perspectives and 
decision making mechanisms. It is for this reason that every member state holds a different 
opinion about the role of Turkey in relation to the issue of energy.  However, that Turkey is a 
crucial player in this arena crucial role is undeniable, so the EU has to consider Turkey’s role 
and make necessary arrangements before making energy security decisions.  
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ÖZET 
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ VE TÜRKİYE İÇİN ENERJİ GÜVENLİĞİ: UYUM VEYAHUT 
UYUMSUZLUK: KARŞILIKLI ÇIKARLARIN KRİTİK OYUNU 
 
ECE ÇAM 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2013 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Enerji Güvenliği, Türkiye’nin Rolü, 
Hükümetlerarasıcılık, Türkiye’nin üyeliği, Rusya, Boru Hatları, Enerji Yolları, Doğu Avrupa 
Ülkeleri 
 
Günümüz uluslararası sisteminde enerji konusu enerji zengini ve enerjiye bağımlı ülkeler için 
çok önemli bir yere sahip. Rusya gibi ülkeler enerji bakımından oldukça zengin ve bu durum 
Avrupa ülkeleri gibi enerji için dışa bağımlı ülkeleri kritik bir pozisyona sokuyor. Bunun 
sonucunda Avrupa Birliği’nde enerji güvenliği tartışmaları gün geçtikçe artıyor; ülkeleri 
enerji kaynaklarının güvenliği konusuna odaklanmaya zorluyor. Artan enerji ihtiyacı ve 
azalan yerli üretim Avrupa Birliğini daha da zor bir duruma sokuyor. Enerji kaynakları için 
Rusya’ya olan bağımlılığı azaltmak için, Avrupa Birliği ve üye devletler alternatif enerji 
kaynakları ve yolları bulmak zorundalar. Bu gerçekle birlikte, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliğinin 
enerji güvenliğindeki yeri kritikleşiyor; Türkiye Avrupa ve enerji kaynakları arasında adeta 
bir görevi görüyor ve hatta ileride Avrupa’nın dördüncü enerji arteri olabilir. Hatta Türkiye 
bunu tam üyelik süreci için kullanabilir. Ancak, Avrupa Birliği bütünleşik bir yapı değil ve 
üye devletler farklı görüşlere ve karar mekanizmalarına sahipler. Bu sebepten dolayı, her üye 
devlet Türkiye’nin enerji güvenliğindeki yeri hakkında farklı bir bakış açısına sahip. Yine de 
Türkiye’nin rolünün önemi inkâr edilemez, bu yüzden Avrupa Birliği, enerji konusunda 
kararlar alırken Türkiye’nin rolünü göz önünde bulundurmalıdır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“…Europe’s energy dependency not only has serious implications for the 
environment, human rights and development in countries that supply Europe’s energy 
needs. It also creates rising insecurities in Europe as a consequence of the Union’s 
reliance on foreign energy sources. This scenario conflicts with EU climate change 
objectives to reduce emissions and provisions of the Lisbon Treaty with regards to 
sustainability and EU activities and policies that have an impact on countries outside 
the EU.”  
Elena Gerebizza (Energy and climate finance officer at the Campaign for the Reform 
of the World Bank) 
In today’s world, one of the most important concerns for states is securing their 
energy needs.  This is because energy resources, which are important for the state’s welfare, 
are not distributed equally in the world. For that reason, many countries are dependent on 
other countries that have a greater supply of energy sources and can therefore export to 
others.  That’s why protecting these energy supplies and securing one’s energy source has 
become critical issues within international relations.  
Energy resources and security is on the top of the agenda for many states as well as 
within international politics. Its importance has been rising since the second half of the 20th 
century. It is certain that energy security will remain one of the most important issues in 
international relations for the near future.  It is possible that this issue may become less 
crucial if states’ dependency on natural gas, oil or fossil fuel decreases, but this does not seem 
likely at the moment. With regards to this current situation, it is possible to argue that energy 
security has reached the same level of importance as economic security and national security 
today.  It could be confidently argued that energy security is one of the most critical issues for 
almost all the countries in the world. This is also why the question of energy resources goes 
beyond economic concerns and emerges as a key security issue for countries. Consequently, 
it is possible to see the concerns with regards to energy shaping states’ foreign policy-making 
processes.  This is why, this thesis rests on this starting point that energy security and 
resources have acquired a vital importance for most of the states in the world. As German 
Chancellor Angela Merker always express the importance of the energy security, and she 
 2 
 
said: “"We cannot go on living day-to-day. We need a long-term strategy," 1 Moreover, she 
had urged EU leaders to discuss questions such as how much energy would the bloc need 
over the coming 15 years, how can it be supplied, which sources of energy should be given 
priority.  
When turning to one of the largest economic blocs in the world, the European Union, 
one could see that energy concerns have also impacted the EU’s decisions and policies with 
regards to international politics.  For instance, if we look at the early years of the European 
integration- the 1950s, the founding treaties of the EU- Paris and Rome Treaties had energy 
security at their very core. "Through the consolidation of basic production and the institution 
of a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and the other countries 
that join, this proposal represents the first concrete step towards a European federation, 
imperative for the preservation of peace.", Schuman said.
2
  First, the 1951 Paris Treaty was 
the milestone for regulating the energy sector with the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community. Second, the 1957 Rome Treaty established the second of the European 
communities, the Euratom which was also about energy resources. While both of these 
treaties indicated the beginning of the EU’s energy policies, the process of integration with 
regards to energy policy was very gradual and evolved slowly over time. In order to assess 
the increased awareness about energy by the EU member states, one must refer to the OPEC 
crisis of 1973, when the EU’s dependence on imported resources of energy became 
dramatically clear. Robbie Diamond, President and CEO of Securing America’s Future 
Energy (SAFE) states that In 1973 we should have learned a harsh but valuable lesson about 
dependence on the Arab world for the lifeblood of our economy and taken steps like Brazil 
and South Africa did to become more independent. 
3
 The 1973 oil crisis painfully increased 
the awareness of how developed countries were vulnerable to external oil shocks, and since 
then, we have begun to see an increased awareness in the EU towards energy security.   
 If oil was one aspect of the energy concerns for the EU, natural gas clearly constituted 
the other.  The EU’s dependence on imported natural gas became more pronounced with the 
accession of Central and Eastern European states that were clearly dependent on the flow of 
natural gas from Russia. With the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the EU’s dependency on 
                                                          
1
 Merkel, Blair say EU needs common energy security policy 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200602/18/eng20060218_243736.html. 
2
 Robert Schumman, 1950. Declaration of 9 May 1950. Europa 
3
 The 1973 Arab oil embargo: Why we have a Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the first place, 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/truth-be. 
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Russian energy sources increased correspondingly, given that the new member states had 
high import dependency rates at the time on Russian energy resources. This was partly due to 
their specific economic ties from the Soviet and the Warsaw Pact era. In addition to this 
situation, disruptions in energy supply from Russia to Ukraine in 2006 and 2008 have led to 
doubts over energy security, in general, and with regards to dependence on Russia, in 
particular, as President Putin has frequently emphasized in   2006 statement that “existing 
socio-economic conditions, and also the strategy for Russia’s exit from the deep crisis and 
restoration of her former power on a qualitatively new basis demonstrate that conditions in 
the natural resource complex remain the most important factor in the state’s near-term 
development.” 4. This understandably caused increased concerns in the EU regarding energy 
security.  
According to the European Commission, the EU’s energy dependency rate in 2006 
had reached 50% and it classified itself as the world’s leading energy importer (European 
Commission, 2006a). This is expected to increase to approximately 70% by 2030. Still, there 
are some other views that since the EU population and economic growth are both declining, 
this is also decreasing their needs for energy. This means that these expectations are still 
diverging. Apart from these diverging views, specifically, the EU’s dependence on natural 
gas is increasing much more so than its dependence on oil. As a result, the member states are 
increasingly concerned about securing natural gas resources as well as uninterrupted flow of 
natural gas to the EU. This highlights why the EU has a growing interest on the transport of 
energy resources, specifically pipelines. At the same time, the thesis looks into the EU’s 
position on the sources of energy, with respect to the diversification of energy suppliers in 
order to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russia. To this end, at their March 2007 summit, EU 
member states moved to fasten European coordination to help secure and diversify energy 
supplies, increase the development and use of renewable and alternative energy resources 
within the EU, and also reduce energy demand and consumption. Even though member state 
governments keep reluctant to cede national sovereignty over energy-security aspects of their 
foreign policies, they have set binding EU-wide targets for the use of renewable energies and 
biofuels, and has agreed to ambitious but non-binding energy efficiency and carbon emission 
reduction targets for the year 2020.
5
 
                                                          
4
 Paul J. Saunders, Russian Energy and European Security a Transatlantic Dialogue, , The Nixon Center, 
February, 2008. 
5
 Belkin, Paul, The European Union Energy Security Challenges, CRS Report for Congress. 
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In both of these aspects, one country, Turkey, emerges as a critical player.  Turkey 
comes into the scene of energy security precisely at this point as an energy hub, due to its 
critical geographical location. This is why, this thesis focuses on the European energy 
security, Turkey’s role within this important issue, and how this, in turn, may affect Turkey’s 
potential membership within the EU. For this reason, the thesis analyzes the member state 
preferences on energy issues. This study refers to oil and natural gas as the main energy 
resources since they constitute more than 60% of the energy consumed in the EU (European 
Commission, 2008a).   Yet, one also needs to keep in mind that the EU’s dependence on oil 
and gas is also destined to decrease parallel to the decline in population and economic growth 
rates. Having said that, no matter what the future demand might eventually become, it is 
highly likely that Turkish role in the transport of these resources will remain critical.  
The EU has already tried to develop different ways to solve its energy security 
problem, and its main objective is to diversify both energy resources and transport routes.  
Accordingly, the EU has developed specific mechanisms such as the Trans-European 
Networks to diversify its supply routes by building alternative routes.  One of the critical 
problems in the EU’s ability to put together a common energy policy is the member states’ 
diverging positions on this issue. This, in turn, makes member states critical actors in shaping 
the EU’s energy policy as well as the future of the transport routes. This of course is a result 
of the differences among the EU members on with regards to energy dependence.
6
 
Overall, when the larger picture is analyzed, it can be seen that the energy issue has 
brought new security problems to Europe and has pushed the Union to develop new ways in 
order to provide energy security. Additionally, this thesis also suggests that Turkey, as a 
candidate country, should be included in the potential solutions for providing energy security. 
Thanks to its geographical position and natural presence of the European system with the 
membership to Customs Unions, NATO, and the Council of Europe, Turkey is not a stranger 
to the EU, and its role is increasingly becoming critical for Europe.  This is due to the fact 
that Turkey is located at the heart of the energy routes. Even more importantly, it is 
increasingly playing a critical regional role and might help the EU find alternative energy 
sources. Thus, since energy security is an important problem for the European Union, 
Turkey’s inclusion to the EU as a full member would help the EU increase its security as well 
as foster a more robust scheme for energy security. 
                                                          
6
 Saunders, Paul J., Russian Energy and European Security; A Transatlantic Dialogue, The Nixon Center, 
February 2008. 
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In short, this thesis proposes that energy security is an important issue for the 
European Union, increasing its vulnerability to energy suppliers. After the oil crisis of 1973 
as well as the transport crisis of 2006, the EU became more aware that it would face 
significant challenges unless it diversified its energy resources. However, not all member 
states are dependent to the same degree on energy suppliers in the East and therefore, they 
have different perspectives about the energy issue.  As a result, the issue of energy security is 
further complicated by the member states’ divergent preferences (Moravscik, 1993; Muftuler-
Bac and Baskan, 2011).  
In order to focus more on the problems that the EU has been facing with regards to 
energy security and to analyze the Turkish role on European energy security, the thesis 
explores first the European Energy Security and then focuses on the Turkish role in further 
detail. Accordingly, the main research question in this thesis is:  
“Taking into consideration the vulnerability of the European Energy Security and the 
candidacy of Turkey to the EU, is it possible to conceptualize a new role for Turkey with 
regards to European energy security and if so, how would this role might affect the Turkish 
membership in the EU?”  
The thesis proceeds with its analysis in three different parts. First, the thesis analyzes 
the evolution of the European energy security since the 1951 European Coal and Steel 
Community and after the oil crisis in 1973 and 1979.  Secondly, the thesis investigates the 
emergence of the EU’s energy security policy, or lack of thereof, as well as the member 
states’ preferences regarding the energy issue.   This part also focuses on the preferences of 
three important member states, namely Germany, France and the UK, as well as some 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe, as these are the ones directly affected by 
energy security.   The main theoretical framework for this analysis is the rational 
intergovermentalist logic, which focuses on the member states’ preferences as the key to 
assess EU- level policies.  As Moravcsik stated (1993), according to rational 
intergovernmentalism, the preferences of member states are the key parameters which affect 
membership status of a candidate country. These preferences associate material benefits 
being as economic and security fields.
7
 Joschka Fischer, the former minister of foreign affairs 
of Germany, referred to the Turkish role in EU energy security and Turkey’s accession to the 
                                                          
7Moravcsik, A. (1993) “Preferences and power in the European Communities: a liberal intergovernment 
approach.”Journal of Common Market Studies 31–4: 482. 
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EU as being tied to one another in his 2004 declaration: “Some old-minded persons are 
talking about that membership of Turkey into the EU would affect negatively. However, I 
cannot ignore realities. Turkey has an extremely important strategic actor for Europe”.8 At 
the intergovernmental level, the relative power of member states determines which states’ 
preferences will be reflected in EU policies. This statement refers to the fact that preferences 
of more powerful actors in the EU are a crucial factor in the process of interstate bargaining 
and in EU policies. Therefore, if the most powerful member states within the EU, such as 
UK, France and Germany, came to a mutually agreed upon  conclusion regarding Turkey’s 
role on European energy security, the positions of other, more minor member countries 
would probably be shaped accordingly. In this study, the analysis of member state 
preferences takes into account the states’ GDP, dependence on imports and their energy 
dependence on third parties.  
Thirdly, the thesis analyzes the possible role that Turkey might play in European 
Energy security with an emphasis on the regional and geographical advantages of Turkey. 
Moreover, this section of the thesis focuses on the multiple pipelines that pass through 
Turkey, such as the Nabucco project.  This analysis ties into the Turkish role in European 
energy security as stressed by the EU Commission. The Commission says (2008) “"the 
development in the southern Caucasus also highlighted Turkey's strategic significance for the 
EU energy security, particularly by diversifying supply routes, and underlined the importance 
of closer energy co-operation between Turkey and the EU."
9
Lastly, it is also mentioned that 
Turkey’s possible role in European Energy Security act as an added value for Turkey’s 
potential membership to the EU. There are some obstacles facing Turkey in terms of its 
membership, but material benefits such as the energy security issue may counteract or at least 
attenuate the effect of these obstacles.  
The thesis would hopefully contribute to the literature on the European Energy 
Security by its analysis of the possible Turkish role as well as by its analysis of the diverging 
member state preferences as the key to understanding EU energy policies. It is now without a 
doubt that the EU needs to find new alternatives for the energy sources for its own sake, and 
should make the necessary arrangements within energy security to make its position more 
stable. This will be critical for its future. If not, Russia will continue to have significant 
                                                          
8
 Muftuler-Baç, Meltem, A Glance to the relationships between Turkey and the EU from a security dimension, 
İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, November 2006. 
9
 Commission hails Turkey’s role in regional stability, http://euobserver.com/enlargement/27025. 
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leverage on the European continent. Turkey can also benefit from this situation and be given 
full membership within the EU thanks to its role as an energy hub, thus becoming the fourth 
artery of the Union.  
The thesis’s main arguments center on the critical role that Turkey is expected to play 
in European energy security. This role is discussed within the perspective of material benefits 
to both parties. The thesis notes that the EU suffers from its own intergovernmental 
framework when formulating an overarching EU-level energy policy. In addition, EU 
members hold divergent positions regarding Turkey’s role in energy security. Thus, these 
different interests and preferences of the member states keep the EU from talkingwith a 
single, united voice. In other words, member states shape their position about energy policy 
and energy security according to national preferences and Turkey’s role in the energy 
security is not equally valued by all the member states.  That is to say, dynamics and the 
interests of the core member states prevent the EU from developing a common energy policy 
and position. For that reason, the benefits that Turkey might derive from its contribution to 
the European energy security could be relatively limited. A further complication within this 
picture comes with the increased ties that the EU is trying to develop with the Middle East 
and Caspian region countries in order to diversify its energy resources. This is of course how 
the EU wants to decrease its dependence on Russia, which is the most powerful and biggest 
country in the region and has proved to be the biggest challenge for the EU.  We could expect 
that Turkey might use its geographical and historical ties with these countries in terms of 
energy ties in return to progress with its EU membership.  
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CHAPTER 1- ENERGY SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
1.1. European Energy Security 
‘[u]njust manipulation or interruption of energy supplies is as much a security 
threat as is military action. Post-soviet countries have been experiencing that 
on a daily basis, as Russia’s appetite for using energy as a political weapon is 
growing.’  
Czech Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs AlexandrVondra 
 ‘Europe may soon have to decide whether to trust Russia’s promise to 
guarantee future energy supplies. That would also mean overlooking its 
authoritarian ways and putting aside fears that it will use its energy resources 
as a political weapon against other countries. Will Europeans be willing to 
exchange their dignity, spiritual heritage and general beliefs in exchange for 
gas supplies?’ 
Former Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis 
 
The common point in both of these declarations from two different leaders of Central 
and Eastern European countries’ is that they illustrate their perceptions and key concerns with 
regards to the European energy security. They reflect the uneasiness among some EU 
members about their dependence of Russia and might even evoke memories of their 
oppression under the Soviet rule during the Cold War years. The main issue here ties back to 
the overarching problem: the issue of diversification of suppliers of both oil and gas, which 
has emerged as the key concern for the European states with regards to energy security, both 
at the present time and for the future.  
This chapter analyzes current European energy security with a focus on the history of 
energy security in Europe and current developments. Today’s international politics are more 
concentrated on energy issues, since there is a significant shift from energy policy to energy 
 9 
 
security.
10
 This situation is due to energy resources becoming the key element of the power in 
the international arena.  Dependency as a result of lack of resources creates important 
problems for countries within international politics, since countries like Russia use this power 
against importer countries. This chapter addresses these issues first by looking into the 
historical developments in the EU with regards to energy security. Secondly, it focuses on the 
multiple crises with regards to energy security, specifically the 1973 OPEC crisis for oil and 
the 2008 crisis over natural gas. Thirdly, the chapter analyzes the EU’s responses these crises. 
Lastly, today’s energy security in Europe with the observation of Energy Policy will be 
explained. 
The main purpose is to demonstrate the evolution of the EU’s energy policy with 
regards to oil and natural gas in different areas, as well as show the diverging preferences of 
the member states as a factor impeding the evolution of a supranational energy policy for the 
EU.  Shortly, the chapter looks at the history of European energy security analyzing the main 
steps of the EU related to the energy issue. The importance of energy security for states is 
illustrated by Philip Lowe, Director General DG Energy European Commission, as “a safe, 
secure, sustainable, and affordable energy supply is a key to economic stability and also, it is 
important for strategic interests for global players”.11 Thus, the energy security concerns of 
states also have significant economic implications.  The conflicts of interests at the global 
level on energy take multiple forms. For example, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 
could be indirectly linked to the desire to control the energy resources in the Middle East. On 
the one hand, Russia emerged as a major power with regards to energy politics since it has 
the richest oil and natural gas resources. On the other hand, the EU and China-two major 
economies- are vulnerable to energy fluctuations as they are, to a very large extent, dependent 
on outside resources for energy. This is why in international politics, energy and sharing of 
energy sources became an important source of contestation and an element shaping the 
distribution of power.  It is, therefore expected that for the EU, energy security is one of the 
key areas of future collaboration.  This is partly tied to the fact that the EU receives most of 
its energy needs from Russia. Therefore, relations with Russia are very critical for the EU. 
Moreover, the EU knows that China is becoming a competitor of the EU because it is also 
seeking energy resources. Therefore, the Commission has stressed the importance of 
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increasing cooperation between the EU and China in an attempt to decrease competition, as 
stated in the Commission speeches. President Barroso reiterates this point as: 
“We are both global stakeholders. Although we have had very different 
pasts, one thing is clear: we share to a large extent a common future, a 
future, which will be determined by the manner in which we use the 
resources of our planet. This is particularly true of energy. Energy is one 
issue where there is clear global interdependence, where our planet is truly 
interlinked….In this light, it is evident that the EU and China create value 
for our world by engaging together into a strong energy partnership, which 
we have been building over the last years.”12 
In these conditions, many member countries of the EU realize that energy security is 
very important for Europe in the new world order because the unipolar system which is not 
the case now changed and the new world order appears to be multipolar and it is being played 
with new actors. This is illustrated by Van Rampuy, The President of European Council as:  
“Energy issues will define the politics of 21st century. Knowing that energy 
could become a really scarce good in a growing world economy, the battle for 
energy may even become a matter of survival, of war and peace. “13 
Yet despite the seeming common position put forward by the Council President, the 
member states of the EU have different rules and regulations amongst themselves; in the 
same way, the energy issue shows a divergence of interests between them. Member states 
have different energy needs given that their access to energy is different and therefore, the 
perception of importance varies accordingly. For instance; newer member states tend to be 
more dependent on Russian gas, and have less leverage in such negotiations. For instance, 
dependence on Russian gas for energy demand in the EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom) is 5%, whereas among states that have joined since 2004 this 
figure is closer to 15%.
14
 This is a sharp difference particularly between Western and Eastern 
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European countries. Realizing the dependence on Russia, let’s look at Ivan Ivanoc’s, 
Bulgarian Member of Parliament from the rightest Democrats for Strong Bulgaria Party and a 
member of the parliamentary Committee for Economic Policy, Energy, and Tourism words: 
“The main weaknesses of us, Bulgarians, is that South Stream does not do any good to lessen 
the energy dependence of our country. In practice with this project our unilateral dependence 
on Russia continues.”15 
In short, the EU does not hold a common view about the energy issue due to their 
power against energy issue. The geographic distribution of energy is shown in the figure 
below.  
 
Map 1.1: European geographic distribution of energy vulnerability 
 
 
The first difference is the split between the old member states of the EU-15 and the 10 
new member states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This is precisely due to the low 
energy efficiency in the production of goods and services in the CEE regions, in combination 
with low income levels. In contrast, household energy consumption in the CEE regions is in 
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general (in reflection of the lower standard of living) lowest in the EU, while with respect to 
energy dependence the CEE countries are mostly at intermediate levels, with the exception of 
Poland, which has a relatively low level of dependence. Therefore, the CEE regions use a lot 
more energy than the other EU regions on average to produce their goods and services, 
which, in turn, means that a larger proportion of their output has to be devoted to the 
purchase of energy. 
Having said that, the European Commission has nonetheless started to work on energy 
and energy security in order to find a common voice for the EU states. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) involves a separate chapter on energy (Article 
194), making some areas of energy policy a shared competence, signaling a move towards a 
common energy policy. With TFEU, a Member State, nonetheless, keeps its right to 
"determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply"(Article 194, §2).16 
The general long-term European energy policy objectives were first mentioned in 
1995 through the publication of a Commission 'White Paper on Energy Policy for the EU' 
(COM (95) 682). It was stated that energy policy must form part of the general aims of EU 
economic policy based on market integration and deregulation, and that public intervention 
must be limited to what is strictly necessary to safeguard the public interest and welfare, 
sustainable development, consumer protection, and economic and social cohesion. Since the 
2000 publication of the Green Paper, the EU has a clearer strategy of energy security. These 
goals are further elaborated in the EU documents, ‘Towards a European Strategy for the 
security of energy supply’ (COM(2000) 769), the 2005Green Paper on 'Energy Efficiency: 
Doing more with less' (COM(2005) 265) and the2006 Green Paper on 'A European Strategy 
for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy' (COM(2006) 105).  
These documents summarize the aims of the European energy policy in a more 
integrated way, in order to secure affordable energy supplies, respect market mechanisms, 
promote energy efficiency and protect the environment.
17
Another important step was taken 
with the Lisbon Treaty (2007) which stated the main aims of the EU's energy policy as 
ensuring the functioning of the energy market, assuring the security of energy supply in the 
Union, promoting energy efficiency and energy saving,  developing new and renewable 
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forms of energy, and promoting the interconnection of energy networks. Moreover, after the 
gas crisis of 2009, Regulation 994/2010 on the security gas supply came into force on 2 
December 2010. According to this regulation, the primary goal is the implementation of 
measures covering mechanisms for handling crises. Following this, on 17 November 2010, 
the European Commission created a strategy on priority infrastructure by 2020. With regards 
to this strategy, major investments would be essential over the next 10 years. 
Although their diverging views, a 2005 German-Russian gas pipeline  agreement and  
Russian manipulation of gas and oil flows to the European market have become a turning 
point as a sense of urgency among European leaders regarding the need for a more 
coordinated strategy. These events create with growing concern among the European public 
and political classes regarding the link between energy production and consumption, and also 
global climate change. Beside 2005 German- Russian gas pipeline issue, disputes between 
Russia and Ukraine and Russia and Belarus have created some undesirable consequences of 
European dependence on Russian energy resources.
18
 Many European observers have stated 
the Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus gas and oil crises as “wake up” calls exposing 
Europe’s energy security vulnerability. Moreover, the crises raised the dual questions of 
Russia’s reliability as an energy partner and Moscow’s willingness to use its energy power as 
a political weapon.  In response, European leaders have supported coordinating decisions on 
energy supply and decided to present a unified front to producer nations like Russia.
19
 
The EU provides more than one quarter of the world’s industrial production so it 
requires considerable energy.
20
 Even though there is some decrease in this output with the 
economic crisis, in the near foreseeable future there does not seem to be a radical change in 
sight. This means even though EU energy needs might not increase dramatically; there still is 
a substantial need for energy even at the current levels. The EU’s 27 member states account 
for approximately 17% of the world’s total energy consumption.21 
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Figure 1.1: World Energy Demand 2010 
 
The figure above shows the world energy demand which is on the rise. Although the 
consumption of energy per person is less than Japan and the USA, its energy needs are equal 
to 1,7 billion tons of oil. When this is considered, the resources of the EU are insufficient for 
the member states. With this respect, the figure below shows the insufficiency in general 
because according to the figure net imports are higher than the energy production.  
Figure 1.2: Production, net imports and consumption of energy in the EU in 2009 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, May 2011  
Furthermore, domestic production currently sustains 46% of the energy used in 
Europe. The EU's important potential source of domestic energy is renewable energy. Today 
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it is about 9% of final EU energy consumption.
22
For oil and natural gas need, the EU must 
resort to importation. However, with regard to nuclear energy, the member states like France 
are using their resources and technologies. Nevertheless, nuclear energy is not enough for the 
EU energy needs; it provides approximately 14% of the EU’s energy needs.23For this reason, 
the European Union turns to or prefers oil and natural gas. One third of imported oil is 
received from Russia. The other countries that provide the EU with oil are Norway (20%), 
Saudi Arabia and Libya (10%). Beside these countries, Iran, Iraq, Algeria and Nigeria are the 
supplier countries for the EU. It is known that the EU imports five times more oil than its oil 
production, so it is dependent on outside resources for the energy.
24
 This is why the EU is 
dependent on energy sources other than its own, in order to both sustain industrial production 
and as well as for domestic consumption needs of its citizens.  The table summarizes the 
energy needs in the EU and also demonstrates the differences among the EU members on 
imported energy sources.  
In the EU, energy needs are significant for both oil and natural gas and to this end 
import dependency is seen at the figure below.  
Figure 1.3: EU-27 Energy Import Dependency 
                                          
Source: Eurostat May 2011- Coal and other solid fuels 
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 The figure below shows the import dependency of member states. It also shows the 
differences between the dependency levels of member states.  
Figure 1.4: Energy Import Dependency in member States in 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat May 2011 
Some European states like the Netherlands, the UK and Norway have the capacity to 
produce natural gas but the need is rapidly increasing so the EU has to import natural gas 
from outside; that creates dependency on external sources. Actually, the supplier countries in 
Europe (Norway, the Netherlands and the UK) are the most secure natural gas resources for 
Europe. However, the resources of the UK are dwindling and the resources of Norway are not 
enough to meet the energy needs of Europe. Therefore, the EU tries to find different 
alternatives. States that are at the North of Europe utilize Russia as their supplier, and others 
that are at the South of Europe, utilize Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and other African countries as 
the supplier. 
25
 
1.2.  The Roots of European Energy Security  
Energy is very important for every aspect of our life; a life can not be thought without 
energy. We continue our daily works with the use of energy. As energy is the case, the 
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security of this important commodity gain great importance. The world encountered wars due 
toc petroleum; or samely witnessed the attacks of pipelines as a result of conflicts between 
the states. Energy is a valuable but also, it can turn to a dangerous weapon, therefore its 
security is very crucial and vital for states.  
In the same way, energy as a valuable commodity has always been very important for the 
EU since its very inception. It could be argued that the European Community was concerned 
about European energy security in Europe. Specifically, the issue of energy has long been in 
the control of the technocrats in the European Community. The establishment of the EU 
began with the unification of coal and steel mines between Germany and France, indicating 
the importance of energy security. Therefore, the Union was divided into three communities 
at the very beginning. The first one is the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
which was initiated by Jean Monnet and launched by Robert Schumann with the aim of 
making war “not only unthinkable but materially impossible” in 1950 and inaugurated with 
the Treaty of Paris in 1952 signed by West Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Belgium and Italy –the original Six. The main aim of the community was to give the 
organization of Franco-German production of coal and steel to a higher authority, which will 
be above the state level hence creating a common market for these sources. It is important to 
point out that in 1950s, coal was meeting two-third of the total energy consumption and the 
share of oil was only 10%. 
After this first step, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was founded 
in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. Euratom established another common market, this time for 
nuclear energy, and its operation was left to a higher authority, which would be responsible 
for the development and distribution of nuclear energy and the sale of the surplus to non-
community members.
26
 The last community is the European Economic Community (EEC) 
which was charged with allocating responsibility for the energy sources such as electricity, 
oil and gas apart from ECSC’s coal and steel, Euratom’s nuclear responsibilities. While 
energy placed that much importance, the security of this commodity also became the crucial 
part of the EU policies.  
The main steps taken on the issue of energy security since the EU was founded can be 
explained as follows. After 1991 Energy Charter Declaration, the 1994 Energy Charter 
Treaty was signed as: “provides a multilateral framework for energy cooperation that is 
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unique under international law.”27 The Treaty was “designed to promote energy security 
through the operation of more open and competitive energy markets, while respecting the 
principles of sustainable development and sovereignty over energy resources.”28 Then, in the 
1995 White Paper, An Energy Policy for European Union, regulations concerning the internal 
energy market were set. The first policy initiative was the Green Paper: Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, which is published in 2000. It involves major 
questions as how to define and how to protect “energy security”.29 These followed by the 
2006 Baku Initiative which was introduced with the aim of establishing a cooperation 
mechanism between the Caspian Sea countries and the Black Sea region. In 2007 the 
Commission adopted a new policy. This puts energy at the core of European relations with 
the third countries. Moreover, this policy the transportation of Caspian energy resources 
became the major aim emphasizing the importance of Turkey and the Nabucco pipeline 
within an overall perspective. 
Last but not least, the EU’s energy security also takes account of environmental 
protection. With regard to this,  the EU has recently made two policy objectives. The first one 
is the EU 20-20-20 Climate Change and Energy Package which foresees that the EU would 
achieve (1)20 percent decrease in greenhouse gas emissions in comparison to 1990 levels; (2) 
increase energy efficiency by 20 percent, and (3) give at least a 20percent share to renewable 
in the energy mix by 2020.
30
 The second one about energy, specially the carbon market is the 
2050 Energy Roadmap aiming to reduce the carbon emissions to 1990 levels below 80-95 
percent by 2050. The EU’s target is to provide a higher level of “decarbonisation”, “energy 
security”, and “competitiveness” in this report. The goal of the Energy Roadmap is to 
compose a long-term European framework energy market and involve all the stake holders in 
this network. 
Concludingly, the EU has been created as an energy community and the notions of 
energy security and supply security are at the very core of the EU, especially after the first 
and the second OPEC oil crises in 1973 and 1979 and following 2006 and 2009 crises.  
As a result of being reliant on imports, the EU is highly vulnerable to any crises and 
interruptions in the imported gas supplies. The EU witnessed and still “faces serious energy 
challenges concerning sustainability and greenhouse gas emissions as well as security of 
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supply, import dependence and the competitiveness and effective implementation of the 
internal energy market.”31  
 
1.3.The Problem of Security of Supplies 
The term “energy security” became precisely important for the world and the EC after 
the first and second oil crises of 1973 and 1979. The first crisis was in 1973 that the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which were operating as a cartel, 
put an embargo to the oil exported to the U.S. and the Netherlands because of these two 
countries’ support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli War (Yom Kippur War).32 As a result of the 
embargo, oil prices increased by more than 475 percent. After this first shock for the oil 
imports, the second OPEC crisis in 1979, which increased the prices by another 134 percent, 
occured.
33
 As a response to these oil shocks, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was 
established in 1974 to “develop response measures, such as the establishment of emergency 
reserves, and to co-ordinate a collective response to any future major disruptions in oil 
supply”.34 These measures were precisely critical for countries which have critical import 
dependence and also is lack of the sufficient regulatory framework, such as the EC. 
The first and the second OPEC crises of 1973 and 1979 brought the question of 
security of supply. As for this issue, alternative energy resources such as hydroelectric, 
atomic powers or more recently, renewable energy, would render a country independent from 
a single supplier. In 1974, after the first OPEC crisis, the Community agreed on the issue that 
the dependency on imports of oil which was 64 percent would be decreased by 50 percent by 
diversification and conservation policies. With this way, with the diversification strategy, the 
consumption of natural gas and other alternative energy resources such as renewable 
resources, and nuclear power increased. After these decisions, natural gas consumption 
reached that of oil and became the second most widely used hydrocarbon in the EU. The EU 
has limited natural gas reserves itself, and it has to import 65 percent of its consumption from 
outside.
35
 However, this developments brought new problems: As a result of the demand 
increase for natural gas, the dependence on foreign suppliers, particularly Russia increased at 
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the same time. With numbers, Russia accounted 37 percent of the total natural gas imports to 
the EU in 2006.
36
Same with the experienceof the OPEC crises, in 2006 and in 2009, two 
other crises happened, but this time they were due to gas. The gas supplies to the EU were cut 
off in 2006 and in 2009 because of political and economic tensions between Moscow and 
Kiev.
37
 As a result of the cut down of the supplies by Gazprom, which is the state-owned 
Russian gas company, EU were left in the cold, especially the South East European states had 
hard times.
38
 These oil and the gas crises indicated that the EU should diversify its supplies as 
well as suppliers and find more reliable sources. Experiencing these crisis, the EU understood 
the necessity of coherent policy measures to prevent further supply disruptions. 
 
The table below reflects how the EU energy production and import values increase at 
the same time from 1960 to 2001. This means that even though the EU is able to produce 
some energy, it is not enough to meet the EU’s consumption demands. This led to an increase 
in the EU’s imports from other countries, especially from Russia as its main supplier.  
 
Table 1.1: Primary energy production and import of the EU (Mtoe) 
Year Production Imports 
1960 360.3 206.2 
1970 408.1 650.2 
1980 584.3 687.6 
1990 708.9 642.1 
1995 740.1 651.1 
2001 761.2 765.9 
2008 842.7 1014.9 
Source: Eurostat  
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Map 1.2: European gas constraints in perspective 
 
Source: http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-
dependence. 
 
 
Table1.2: The import dependence ratios in the IEA and Eurogas Scenarios 
Source: Christie, pp. 25. 
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World gas reserves are plentiful with the potential of at least sixty years 
consumption.
39
 These reserves are at the hands of few countries such as Iran, Qatar and 
Russia. Therefore, Russia has no fear about the quantity of gas available. EU is still 
dependent on foreign energy sources, especially increasingly dependent on gas exports from 
Russia. For countries who choose to prohibit or tightly control nuclear industries, such as 
Germany and Italy, Russia is the key provider. Statistically, the EU’s energy consumption is 
increasing day by day. Energy import dependence has always existed in Europe and it is 
expected to rise 71% by 2030. This dependence creates the question of security of supply, 
because supply issue is vital for Europe as a continent that is the center of industry. 
Therefore, the OPEC crises were very important for Europe in illustrating the EU’s member 
states’ dependence on external sources of energy- specifically oil. The Graph above shows 
energy dependency of Europe. Energy dependency indicates the extent to which an economy 
relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs. The indicator is calculated as net 
imports divided by the sum of gross inland energy consumption plus bunkers. 
1.4. The EU’s Responses to Deal with Energy Crisis  
As argued in the previous section, the EU has from time to time faced energy crisis 
and its ability to deal with these crisis depended on its ability to adopt common measures. 
This section addresses the EU’s efforts in dealing with energy crisis and its energy 
dependence on external suppliers.  
In the 1980s, the European Commission concentrated on the creation and deregulation 
of a “Single Market” for energy. In this regard, the need for integration of the current markets 
was understood and the energy market became the target of increasing competition. Almost 
simultaneously, the trade-off between energy and the environment entered the EU’s agenda 
on energy security given thatthe production and consumption processes of the energy carry 
the potential to harm the environment. Therefore, environmental protection patterns were 
explored in order to lessen the impact of energy production on the environment. This was 
also when the search for environmentally-friendly energy sources begins.  
Following the fall of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1990s, the EU developed 
some initiatives for its own energy security in order to ensure its own stability. After the Cold 
War, the EU tried to increase security of supplies, sufficiency of production, transportation, 
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distribution and usage of energy and find new ways for protecting the environment. In order 
to realize these targets, firstly, in 1991, the Energy Charter Declaration was composed and it 
paved the way for the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, which “provides a multilateral framework 
for energy cooperation that is unique under international law.” Moreover, the treaty was 
“designed to promote energy security through the operation of more open and competitive 
energy markets, while respecting the principles of sustainable development and sovereignty 
over energy resources.” Signed in 1994, the treaty was enforced in 1998, and was signed or 
acceded by 51 member states plus ECSC and Euratom.  
The EU gives priority to the security of supplies and transportation. Intelligent Energy 
for Europe 2002 was developed in order to realize these aims. The interest shown by EU for 
the regions that affect the European security especially focuses on two points: Energy and 
Stabilization. EU tried to conduct its policy towards these regions , so developed some 
projects in line with these purposes. With regards to European energy security, Pierre Morel, 
EU Special Representative for Central Asia (Caucasus) gave a speech in the Foreign 
Relations Commission in March 2008. Morel said that "We, as EU, are encouraging both 
cooperation and competitive conditions with these countries. EU shall continue its 
partnership and strategic cooperation with these countries in the next stages."
40
For this 
reason, programs like TACIS 1991, TRACECA 1993, and INOGATE 1995 were established 
in order to make the energy transportation more secure. TACIS 1991 is highlighted as a 
success story. The Tacis program began in 1991 and was replaced in 2007 by the “European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - ENPI”. The original Tacis aims were to support 
the process of transition to market economies and democratic societies in the countries of 
Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.
41
TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) is the international program 
comprised of the EU and 14 member states of the Eastern European, Caucasian and Central 
Asian Region established in 1993 for technical assistance for the development of the 
transport corridor between Europe and Asia across the Black Sea. Its aim was to support 
political and economic independence of the Republics by increasing their capacity to access 
European and world markets.
42
INOGATE is the energy technical cooperation program 
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between the EU, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Central Asia and it began in 1995. 
This initiative was followed by two Energy Conferences, one in Baku in 2004 and in Astana 
in 2006, which would lay out the INOGATE framework. It had four objectives: the 
convergence of energy markets on the basis of the EU principles, enhancing energy security, 
supporting sustainable energy development, and attracting investment towards energy 
projects of common and regional interests.
43
 
Moreover, the EU created additional programs such as ALTENER II, SAVE, 
COOPENER, SYNERGY, and MEDA. ALTENER II began in 1998 and aimed to provide 
renewable energy from water and wind. It was the product of European commission as a 
result of the pursuit of alternative energy sources.
44
SAVE was initiated in 1991 with the aim 
of saving energy in industry, commerce and transport. The SAVE programs are 4-year 
programs, with the first one held between 1991-1995, and then 1996-2000. On February 
2000, SAVE program was combined with five-year Energy Environment Program (1998-
2002). On April 9
th, 2002, SAVE was included in the “Intelligent Energy for Europe 
2002”.45COOPENER aims included the efficient use of renewable energy sources. This 
program was carried out 2003 to 2006. SYNERGY was a program for international energy 
cooperation between the EU and non-member states. It was different from other EU programs 
because it considered the external dimension of the EU energy policy, and emphasized 
regional and cross-border cooperation.
46
 
More importantly, the European Commission initiated a ministerial conference on 
energy, hosted by the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Baku on November 13
th
, 
2004.
47
 The representatives of the Caspian Littoral States, namely Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation; and the neighboring countries, namely Armenia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan attended the conference to 
meet with the representatives of the European Commission and the EU member states. 
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During the conference, the participants agreed on some mutual interests: supporting 
the gradual development of regional energy markets in the Caspian Littoral States and their 
neighboring countries; enhancing the attraction of funding for new infrastructures; embarking 
on energy efficiency policies and programs; and making progress towards a gradual 
integration between the respective energy markets and the EU market.
48
 Furthermore, the 
importance of regional cooperation in the energy sector in order to achieve sustainable 
economic and social development, as well as contributing to peace, stability and prosperity in 
the region. They accepted to use the INOGATE Technical Secretariat as a coordination 
mechanism.  
The target of “Baku Initiative” is to facilitate the progressive integration of the energy 
markets of the respective region into the EU market as well as the transportation of the 
extensive Caspian oil and gas resources towards Europe, be it transiting through Russia or via 
other routes such as Iran and Turkey.
49
 Moreover, it is important for the EU to have secure 
and safe export routes for Caspian oil and gas due to security of energy supply. This is largely 
because the EU wants to increase the geographical diversification of the EU’s external energy 
supplies. Additionally, supplying energy to the EU market at competitive international prices 
will be important for regulating the economic, social, and political development of countries 
of the Caspian region. 
The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan states that the principles and 
provisions of the Conclusions and the Concept Paper shall not be applied by Azerbaijan with 
regard to Armenia until the settlement of the conflict with the latter. The Russian participants 
of the Conference on “Energy Co-operation between the EU, the Caspian Littoral States and 
their neighboring countries,” held on November 13th, 1994 in Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan, 
expressed some reservations towards their attitude regarding the Conclusions and attached 
Concept Paper, proposed for the approval at the end of the event. 
50
 
After the Baku Initiative in 2004, the Commission adopted a new policy which puts 
energy at the center of the European relations with the Caspian Sea countries in 2007. In this 
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policy, the transportation of the Caspian energy resources became the major aim which 
emphasizes the importance of Turkey and the Nabucco pipeline in an overall perspective.  
1.5. Energy Security for the European Union in the 21
st
 century 
The European Union is the second largest energy consumer following the USA. The 
Union imports more than 50% of its energy sources from energy-producing countries.
51
 
Therefore, it can be said that the EU is the largest energy importer of the world. With regards 
to this situation, the EU prioritizes energy sector issues and has tried to complete the creation 
of the internal energy market and ameliorate the relations with energy producers in foreign 
affairs. However, it is certain that the EU has some problems in the energy issue, specifically 
in energy policy. The energy need of the EU is increasing day by day, so there is an 
immediate need for comprehensive, regulated energy policies for the future of energy 
security.  
Actually, two important events caused a dramatic change in the natural gas trade and 
major natural gas markets. The first event is the famous “Arab Spring” which started in 
Tunisia in December 2010, and caused civil unrest by pro-democracy demonstrations, 
revolutionary activities, and protests.
52
 It created domino effect and spreaded to some other 
parts of the Middle East and North Africa. This unexpected event affected the global oil and 
gas markets. As a result of the unrest, the emergency oil stocks used by the IEA member 
countries for the third time in IEA’s history.53  
The second important event in 2010 was the big earthquake in Japan which caused a 
destructive tsunami and also damage to the Fukushima nuclear reactor. This unexpected 
disaster influenced mainly the global natural gas and LNG markets since all the nuclear 
reactors in Japan were shut down on May 5, 2012. Moreover, the huge energy deficit of 
Japan is being compensated by imported hydrocarbon sources, mainly natural gas in LNG 
form.
54
 
According to Eurogas Statistics 2011, the ratio of natural gas in primary energy demand of 
the EU was 25 percent and demand of oil was 34 percent in 2010. It is thought that 
natural gas consumption will rise by 5 percent, whereas oil consumption will decrease by 5 
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percent by 2035.
55
 
An EU level policy on energy has yet to be adopted. Therefore, the European Union 
member states do not have a legal obligation to pursue a common energy policy and strategy. 
Each country will make different decisions and strategic choices. However, over the past ten 
years, two major policy developments related to the climate change challenge and the 
establishment of a single Internal Energy Market, have brought attention to the need for 
policy coordination and a common energy strategy in the European Union. Such a common 
policy will be difficult to achieve given complexity of the issues and the conflicting 
objectives. Whereas some progress has been made in the field of sustainability, the 
realization of a common energy market and of a common external energy policy in order to 
secure supplies has proven more difficult to achieve. Moreover, energy policymakers in 
Europe are faced with important decisions, which have long term consequences given the 
long lead times for energy investments and the long lifespan covering several decades. In 
considering such decisions, it is important to have a contextual and consistent view on the 
various aspects of the economy that will be affected. For this purpose, energy systems and 
policy analysis on a European scale is required. 
1.6. European Energy Policy  
The EU has been working on energy issue in order to challenge areas related to 
increasing import dependency, limited diversification, high and volatile energy prices, 
growing global energy demand, security risk affecting producing and transit countries, 
growing threats of climate change, slow progress in energy efficiency, challenges posed by 
the increasing share of renewable energy, and the need for increased transparency, further 
integration and interconnection on energy markets. 
56
Therefore, some measures are to be 
implemented in order to achieve an integrated energy market, thus ensuring security of 
supply and sustainability of the energy sector. Moreover, these points are at the core of the 
European energy policy. Additionally, as a result of the changing geopolitics of energy 
supply to the EU, discussions at the EU supranational level about the necessity to define a 
common EU external energy become very intense now. Coby van der Linde, Director of the 
Clingendael International Energy Programme states that “energy supply could not just be left 
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up to the markets as Member States were unlikely to hand responsibility for security of 
supply policies over to the EU given their differing foreign and security policies.”57 
As noted in the previous sections, the risks of huge reliance on the non-EU energy 
exporters initially became clear after the 1973 oil shock, when the members of the OPEC 
decided to radically rise the oil prices. Due to the oil shock, the Commission supported the 
precaution that “to reduce the risk of failure of certain streams of supply, sources must be 
sufficiently spread and none must occupy a too exclusive place.”58 However, the member 
states responded individually to the Commission’s recommendations, so its role kept limited, 
since the member states did not want to give their sovereignty to a supranational authority.  
After the 1990s, the Commission has mentioned the cost-effectiveness of harmonizing 
energy supply security policies at the supranational level instead of administering them 
nationally.
59
 The Commission has referred the issues of “strategic oil reserve, strategic gas 
storage capacity, emergency sharing arrangements, and trade and aid deals with foreign 
producers.”60 However, the Energy Chapter was mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, 
but it was still leaving the Commission dramatically constrained in terms of its scope of 
action. For the first time, the Constitutional Treaty which was not ratified in 2005 involved a 
coherent energy article (Art.III-256). Then, Lisbon Treaty in 2007 largely keeps the article in 
a specific chapter on energy. The EU member states and the Commission inserted certain 
articles about energy into the treaty as a result; the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) has a separate chapter on energy (Article 194) which makes some areas of 
energy policy a shared competence, signaling a move towards a common energy policy. 
According to this Treaty, a Member State still keeps its right to "determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure of its energy supply"(Article 194, §2).61 However, there are specific provisions, 
including
62
:  
Security of supply: Article 122 creates an EU competence to adopt preventive measures  
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"in a spirit of solidarity between Member States (...) if severe difficulties arise in the supply 
of certain products, notably in the area of energy".
63
 
Energy networks: Articles 170-172 establish an EU competence with regard to developing 
trans-European networks, inter alia in the field of energy infrastructure.  
Coal: Protocol 37 explains the financial consequences resulting from the expiry of the ECSC 
Treaty in 2002.  
Nuclear energy: The Treaty launching the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom 
Treaty) serves as the legal basis for most European actions in the field of nuclear energy; in 
particular, Articles 40-52 (investment, joint undertakings and supplies) and 92-99 (the 
nuclear common market). The Euratom Treaty has been largely unchanged since it entered 
into force in 1958 and has kept a legal personality distinct from the EU. The EP's role in the 
decision-making procedures under the Euratom Treaty is limited, given that it has only been 
given consultation powers.  
Moreover, there are some other provisions affecting energy policy, some of which include;  
Internal energy market: Article 114 TFEU on harmonization measures works as a legal 
basis for EU legislation that has the functioning of the internal energy market as its main 
objective. 
External energy policy: Articles 216-218 TFEU on the conclusion of international 
agreements are related to energy policy given that several energy projects of European 
interest, such as Nabucco and Desertec, have an external dimension. In most energy-related 
agreements, the ordinary legislative procedure applies.  
Still, as noted, most of the EU member states guard their sovereignty over their energy 
policies, suppoting that it a sensitive decision to be taken at the national level. Stanley 
Hoffmann argues, self-interested states are quite obstinate in the face of European 
integration.
64
However, the heads of governments recently started to accept the above-
discussed Commission proposals that can be considered as steps towards the eventual 
realization of a European-wide energy policy. The EU heads of state accepted some of 
Commission proposals with the expectation of outlining the groundwork for an “Energy 
Policy for Europe.”65  
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1.6.1. Chapter 14 of Acquis Communitaire: Energy  
The European Union is dependent on imports for half of its supplies, and it is 
expected to reach 70% by the year 2030.
66
 For natural gas, dependence could reach 70 %; for 
oil 90% and for coal even 100%.
67
 It is believed that enlargement could probably reinforce 
these trends, although certain former candidate countries are producers of primary energy, 
such as Poland for coal and Romania for oil and gas. As a result of this situation, the 
European Commission launched in 2001 a wide debate (Green Paper 'Towards a European 
strategy for the security of energy supply). It is argued that a more stable flow of energy, 
ultimately underpinning the Union's efforts to ensure peace, stability, security and prosperity 
is needed. This is actually because of the fact the level of import dependence depends 
considerably on member states. Additionally, natural gas is not available to all consumers in 
the European market in an easy way due to the geographical pattern of pipelines and 
distribution systems. With the enlargement process, this trend will be likely to increase as a 
result of new members coming. These considerations have triggered the member states to 
take a number of actions towards cooperation for the issue of energy. Moreover, The 
Commission states more on energy and potential members in its recent meeting and 
publications such as Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013. 
Turning to the energy acquis, it embodies the body of all energy related EU law, 
regulations and policies. In order to implement the acquis, there is a need for adequate 
legislation and functioning institutions. For instance, a regulatory body is required in the 
electricity, gas directives, and a nuclear safety authority. 
According to the energy acquis, candidate countries are required to
68
; 
 decide on an overall energy policy with clear timetables for restructuring the sector; 
 prepare for the internal energy market (the Gas and Electricity directives; Cross 
border exchanges in electricity; the Directive on electricity produced from renewable 
energy sources) 
 improve energy networks in order to create a real European market 
 prepare for crisis situations, particularly through the constitution of 90 days of oil 
stocks 
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 address the social, regional and environmental consequences of the restructuring of 
mines 
 waste less energy and increase the use of renewable energies such as wind, hydro, 
solar and biomass in their energy balance 
 ensure the safety of nuclear power plants in order that electricity is produced 
according to a high level of nuclear safety 
 ensure that nuclear waste is handled in a responsible manner; and prepare for the 
implementation of Euratom Safeguards on nuclear materials. 
Energy policy directly affects every member state in the EU. According to the European 
Commission, the issues and challenges related to energy require action at European level; no 
single national government can deal with the issue successfully alone. Therefore, European 
Union Member States and European industry can develop energy sectors which best meet the 
needs of citizens and our economy, but also minimising damage to our environment. The 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy manages work in this area, also 
considering the enlargement process and regional cooperations. For instance, thinking the 
five countries of the Maghreb and their efforts towards closer cooperation and deeper 
regional integration, Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger said: "Energy plays an 
important role in the development of the region. With our Mediterranean Solar Plan we are 
aiming to help our partners,"
69
. From the statement, it can be referred that energy has kept its 
primary role in the EU’s agenda in all areas.   
 
1.6.2. Securing Supplies 
According to the Commission, the EU imports about 50% of its overall energy 
needs.
70
Its import dependency is expected to grow through 2030, from 80 to 93%t in the case 
of oil, and from 57 to 84% in the case of gas. Russia accounts for 27% of the EU’s total oil 
consumption and 30% of its oil imports.
71
 Similarly, Russia makes up for some 24% of EU 
total gas consumption and 44% of its gas imports. Most significantly, Europe’s import of 
Russian gas is expected to double in the next 25 years. One way of securing Europe’s energy 
supplies is by reducing its import dependency through internal measures, such as adapting the 
energy mix towards alternative and renewable sources, increasing energy efficiency, and 
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reducing consumption. However, given that the share of oil and gas in the EU’s total energy 
consumption mix will far outgrow its domestic production and demand in the foreseeable 
future, it is imperative for the EU to forge an effective external energy policy. It is with 
regard to this international dimension of energy security that the EU has made the least 
progress. The inability of EU leaders to speak with one voice to third parties and the 
Commission’s recent conclusion of several agreements with producing states, results in EU 
member states continuing to give precedence to their own external energy policies and hence, 
they seek to secure energy supplies through bilateral deals. The two key challenges with 
regard to the EU’s external energy policy concern its relations with Russia and the 
diversification of its energy imports by exploiting global supply markets. 
 
Table 1.3: Imports of Natural Gas and Oil for EU-27 
 2005 2020 2030 
Oil 82% 90% 93% 
Natural Gas 57% 70% 84% 
Source: European Commission Green Paper on “Energy Policy for Europe”, Brussels, 2007 
 
1.6.3. Protection of Environment 
Protection of the environment holds an important place in the EU energy policy, since 
95% of carbon emissions are based on fossil fuel usage in the EU. The EU targets the 
decrease of these emissions not only to protect the environment but also to prevent climate 
change. In this respect, the EU has specified some target goals: increase energy efficiency, 
increase usage of renewable energy sources in primary consumption, develop clean energy 
technologies, and use fuel oil that burns less CO2.
72
 
All these efforts are needed in order to meet the goals set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. 
According to the Kyoto protocol, the European Union should decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions by 8% between 2008 and 2012. After Kyoto (and by 2020), the EU should increase 
energy efficiency by 20%, increase renewable sources by 20%, and decrease the CO2 
emission by 20%.  
The EU has enough coal reserves however, and hence, it prefers natural gas in order 
to decrease carbon emissions. Therefore, the union’s need for natural gas increases daily. It 
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means that dependency on outside sources will increase too. It follows that the target of 
protecting the environment is affected by these developments.  
For the issue of energy saving, the EU gives importance on cogeneration technology. 
This technology responds the 15% of EU’s electricity demand and this rate will increase in 
the following years. Moreover, nuclear energy cannot be used due to political reasons; so 
electricity energy will gain more importance. Last but not least, the protection of environment 
also requires decrease in tanker traffic in the sea. Therefore, pipelines will become vital.     
 
1.7. EU Dependence on Russia 
 Given its wealth of natural resources, Russia is bound to remain a key energy partner 
for the EU. However, the gas row between Russia and Ukraine in the winter of 2006, which 
resulted in a temporary cut off of supply to Europe, generated heightened concern within 
Europe regarding their perceived dependency on Russia.
73
 In fact, EU-Russian energy 
relations are marked by a high degree of interdependence. While Russia’s Gazprom supplies 
gas to over 20 European countries, Russia is highly dependent on the EU energy market. 
Over 60% of Russia’s gas and oil exports flow to Europe, providing 60% of Russia’s cash 
earnings. Moreover, Russia is heavily dependent on Western technology to extract reserves 
for future production. Despite this factual interdependence, no stable and dynamic EU-
Russian energy relationship has emerged.  
One issue concerns fair, transparent, and reciprocal access to energy resources, 
transport infrastructure, and markets. As Russian national energy companies increasingly 
control supply chains of extraction, production, transportation, and sales to Europe, 
Europeans question the extent to which Russian companies should be allowed to operate in 
their markets. In response, the EU is insisting on equal access for European companies in 
Russia’s market. However, Russia is unlikely to liberalize its internal market, particularly the 
transport sector, and instead insists on EU guarantees for long-term supply contracts. As 
Russia has never ratified the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Transit Protocol that 
would provide a regulatory framework for EU-Russian energy relations, business is 
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conducted on a case-by-case basis. With Russia continuing to affirm that it still intend to 
follow the key principles of the ECT, the EU should work to include them in a new bilateral 
partnership and cooperation agreement, in particular regulatory and dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  
As the EU is determined to strengthen the producer-transit-consumer chain in a 
common regulatory space, shaping such a space with Russia would mark a success that is 
likely to influence EU energy relations with other countries. European cohesion is a 
precondition for the EU to enter into these negotiations from a position of strength. However, 
beyond the recent mandate approved by the EU Council of Ministers to negotiate with 
Russia, the positions of member states differ. This is partly the result of their varying degrees 
of gas import dependency on Russia, which ranges from 100% in the case of Bulgaria, 
Finland, Estonia, and Romania to 0% in the case of the UK, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain. It is also related to the objectives of some European state-owned companies to invest 
in Russia. Moscow is thus able to employ different rules when dealing with different states 
and has forged partnerships with some EU members to the detriment of others. The desire to 
enhance cooperation in the energy sector is understandable when the dependence of the EU 
on Russian energy and Russia’s dependence on the revenues from the EU is taken into 
account.
74
 
 
1.7.1 Diversifying Suppliers and Transportation Routes 
Diversification is a key concern of EU energy security, because Russia is unable to 
meet Europe’s growing energy demand and it reduces the risk of serious and negative 
economic consequences in the case of interruption of energy flow. Moreover, the main focus 
of the European Union’s diversification efforts is about gas. The challenge is not just to find 
reliable producers, but also to build new transportation routes, find energy at affordable 
prices and continue sustainability. Unlike oil, gas is difficult to store and is mainly 
transported with pipelines, which means that gas supply systems are regional rather than 
global. Most importantly governments make long term agreements or follow the take-or-pay 
system. There is no common gas market contrary to oil. Nowadays, Europe’s gas 
                                                          
74“Russian energy exports account, in value, for some 45% of exports to the EU. 50% of Russian oil exports 
(crude and products) of 218 million tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) were to the EU in 2001. This represented 20% 
of the EU’s oil imports and 17% of total EU oil consumption. Some 63% (130 billion cubic metres (Bcm)) of 
Russia’s natural gas exports of 205 Bcm were delivered to European countries in the year 2000, with contractual 
requirements to increase deliveries to around 200 Bcm by the year 2008. Approximately 56% (73 Bcm) of the 
natural gas exported to Europe in 2000 was delivered to the EU.”, for further info: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/overview/why_en.htm. 
 35 
 
transportation infrastructure belongs to Russia, Algeria, and Norway. Until liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) processing and terminals for tanker transportation are more fully developed, the 
EU will have to build new pipelines if it seeks to diversify its gas supplies.  
The main focus with regard to energy diversification has been on intensifying 
relations with countries of the Caspian Region, for instance, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Iran. This region has the two advantages of holding large reserves of 
undeveloped gas and oil and of being situated geographically close to Russia, allowing for 
direct transportation lines to Europe. The major EU-supported Nabucco pipeline is projected 
to transport Caspian gas through Turkey and across Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary into 
Austria. The Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) pipeline and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), run 
by Swiss EGL and Norway’s StatoilHydro, is also designed to carry Caspian gas into the 
heart of Europe.
75
 
 
1.7.2. Nabucco and South Stream 
The high import dependence of the European Union for natural gas has already been 
mentioned in the previous sections. As noted, the increased dependence makes the importing 
countries very vulnerable to gas interruptions. For instance, 80 percent of the 
Gazprom exports were entering the EU via Ukraine before the opening of the Nord Stream 
Pipeline. Then, the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 crush the EU countries like a natural disaster. 
Beside that, in 2010 and 2011 the dispute between Russia and Belarus over different issues, 
including the issue of the energy prices, affected the EU and neighbouring countries too.   
In order to prevent situations like these ones, direct pipelines from Russia to the EU 
are began to be planned. The South Stream Pipeline project proposed by Moscow are one of 
those pipelines. This pipeline is supposed to run under the Black Sea, reaching firstly to the 
Bulgarian and Hungarian markets. Due to this project, tensions were raised, because Russia 
should have get Turkey’s permission since it will also cross its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEC). However, the EU and Turkey have other plans for the Southern Gas Corridor project. 
Then, the South Stream project was not backed by the EU and the Turkey. After all, Turkey 
granted permission to build the South Stream pipeline that connects to the same markets as 
the Southern Gas Corridor will do.
76
 The construction was supposed to start in 2012 and the 
project was said to become operational in 2015, however so far no initiatives has been done.  
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Similarly, the Nabucco project is a new gas pipeline connecting the Caspian region, Middle 
East and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary with Austria and further on with 
the Central and Western European gas markets. In respect of its lenght (3,300 km), it would 
carry a reasonable amount of the gas volumes. 
77
 Although there are negative expectations 
about the Nabucco project due to TANAP as a direct competition project to the Nabucco, 
Turkey’s energy and natural resources minister, Taner Yıldız said on 18 May 2012 that it 
would not be appropriate to say the Nabucco project is over.
78
 
Russia has been very effective in competing with these European projects by 
supporting its own pipeline projects. Blue Stream is a trans-Black Sea pipeline constructed by 
Gazprom and Italy’s ENI to carry gas from Russia to Turkey.79 The same two companies are 
now pursuing the South Stream pipeline project that would carry gas from the Russian coast 
of the Black Sea to Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece and from there on a south-western route 
into southern Italy and on a north-western route into Serbia and Hungary, continuing on to 
Austria or northern Italy. Although South Stream is considered by many experts not to be 
commercially viable, it serves as a counter to Nabucco and renders the European project less 
competitive. Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and Serbia have already signed cooperative 
agreements with Russia. Hungary, in particular, hopes to become a new hub for Russian gas 
to Europe. Because this would undermine Austria’s role as a hub for Nabucco gas, Vienna is 
now contemplating the idea of integrating Nabucco with South Stream and filling the pipeline 
with Russian gas. Similarly, Greece is proposing to fill the Turkey- Greece- Italy (TGI) 
pipeline with gas from Russia. 
European gas diversification efforts face several additional challenges. The EU must 
compete for Caspian gas with the Russian, Chinese, and other Asian markets. Moreover, the 
border link of the Caspian seabed among the littoral states remains an unresolved issue, 
which could negatively affect transportation. Furthermore, while Iran’s massive gas reserves 
make it a potentially important supplier for the EU, in particular for the Nabucco pipeline, 
this largely depends on a resolution of the question of its nuclear program. Some experts 
predict that the real growth areas for European gas supplies are in North Africa and the 
Middle East. If the EU seeks to create a comprehensive gas supply system that is as 
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interdependent as possible, it will have to intensify its relations with these regions, despite the 
difficulties of doing business with many of the producer countries. The more Europe relies on 
external gas supplies, the more need there will be for regulatory, legal, and dispute settlement 
mechanisms. The EU will want to ensure that the environmental impact of producing states is 
limited by an expanded Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, strengthening the work of multilateral 
organizations, such as the International Energy Agency and the World Trade Organization, 
can help regulate competition for limited routes and supplies. The EU should continue to 
improve conditions for private investment in producer countries in cooperation with the US 
and the World Bank. At the same time, the EU will want to ensure that its demand does not 
undermine European Neighbourhood Policy objectives of economic liberalization by making 
states dependent on payments for hydrocarbons. 
 The EU energy strategy of March 2007 is an important milestone towards a common 
energy policy. However, the challenges remain compelling. It will be difficult to create a 
fully integrated internal market as long as external supply sources are concentrated in Russia. 
It will be equally difficult to diversify supplies as long as vertically integrated energy 
companies resist ceding a share of their domestic markets and their privileged relationships 
with individual producers. Finally, until Europe strengthens its own internal energy market, it 
will be difficult to encourage its suppliers, such as Russia and Algeria, to do the same. The 
three pillars of the EU energy strategy – competitiveness, security of supply, and 
sustainability of energy – are interlinked. Therefore, it is essential that the Europeans define 
priorities and develop an integrated framework. This will require the EU members to 
intensify their debate on how to translate policy statements into concrete actions in each of 
the pillars. In the near term, a comprehensive strategic EU approach towards energy security 
is unlikely to emerge. Given rising energy prices, growing demand, and unpredictable 
suppliers and routes, this lapse could impact negatively on the economies of European 
member states. 
1.8. Conclusion 
Although energy is very critical issue the world over, the EU does not yet seem to 
fully agree on a common energy policy or strategy. Due to lack of harmonized and common 
energy policy, the EU has security problems in the area of energy. If it succeeds in creating a 
common energy policy, its role in the global arena increases more effectively. In order to 
solve this problem, the Commission foresees having to take some steps. Firstly, the 
infrastructure for oil and natural gas pipelines is needed, the energy systems should be 
harmonized, and it should become complementary. Secondly, there is a need to enhance the 
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relations with energy producing countries and countries located between energy transfer 
points. In particular, relations with Russia are emphasized more. Moreover, the other supplier 
countries are mentioned but the concentration is on the point that the relations should be 
carried under the Common energy policy determined by the EU. 
80
 
In short, although creation of a common energy policy is a problem for the union, the 
Commission gives importance on the energy issue, and this emphasis is increasing with 
reports and papers. Lack of energy policy creates weaknesses in the international arena, 
because the enforcements of the EU can become ineffective. This is also as a result of the fact 
that the decision making mechanism is at the hand of the nation states. Certainly, the EU 
intervenes with regards to energy policies with financial and executive implementations; but 
these are limited interventions. The most important examples of this are regulations aimed at 
making energy consumption efficient.
81
In this sense, it is important for the EU to provide 
incentives for improved relations with energy producing and transit countries through 
investments, in order to procure energy security. The next chapter addresses the role of 
member states and their preferences in the formulation of an EU energy security policy. 
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CHAPTER 2- PREFERENCES OF MEMBER STATES ON ENERGY ISSUES 
 The previous chapter analyzed the evolution of the energy policy in the European 
Union with the main conclusion that the EU still does not have an overarching policy for 
energy security.  This brings us into the theoretical framework to understand the emergence 
of EU level policies. This chapter focuses on the member states’ preferences, in line with the 
theory of rational intergovernmentalism, and assesses the diverging preferences of the 
member states as the key to understand the lack of an EU level energy policy.  It is not 
possible for all member states to perceive energy security as a vital issue. For that reason, it 
can be argued that energy security is critical for some member states whereas it is not as 
important for others. Therefore, there is a divergence between the EU member states over 
what they see as critically important in energy security. In order to further explore this point, 
this chapter will delve into the intergovernmental school within the EU framework first, and 
then, investigates the member states preferences on energy security, specifically the “Big 
Three”: Germany, France, and the UK.  
 
2.1. Intergovernmentalism at the EU Level 
  According to Nugent (2006), intergovernmentalism could be seen as “arrangements 
whereby nation states, in situations and conditions they can control, cooperate with one 
another on matters of common interest. The existence of control, which allows all 
participating states to decide the extent and nature of this cooperation means that national 
sovereignty is not directly undermined.”82Intergovernmentalists focus on state actors and the 
dominant concept of national sovereignty and security in interstate relations.
83
 
Intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework offers the logic of diversity, which ‘set 
limits to the degree which the spillover process can limit the freedom of action of the 
governments. The implications of the logic of diversity are that on vital issues of common 
interest, losses are not compensated by gains on other issues’.84 Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism involves three critical elements which combine the following: a liberal 
theory of national preference formation; an intergovernmental analysis of interstate 
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negotiation and the assumption of rational state behavior.
85
In order to understand the 
theoretical framework for European Union Integration, different theorists began political 
debates over EU policy making in terms of autonomy and authority.
86
 Theorists who support 
intergovernmentalism consider key actors to be nation states and their corresponding 
governments, while supranationalist supporters argue that it is supranational organizations 
and their institutions who represent it. 
Intergovernmentalism mention the limitations of supranationalism exemplified by the 
Luxemburg compromise in 1965, when then French Ministers boycotted Council meetings in 
a process later known as the “empty chair” policy, and the failure of the paradigm to take into 
account the role of strong and influential National leaders and the resilience of the Nation 
State.
87
 The intergovernmentalists argue that Federalism could be characterized by skepticism 
as there was differential acceptance of the objectives of a federal Europe by member states of 
the European Union. The intergovernmentalists argue that neofunctionalism is limited since it 
assumes that integration in low politics, such as economics, will lead to integration in areas of 
high politics, such as sovereignty.  Instead, it posits that this would not be possible since the 
issues of high politics are integral to the national interest hence integration would only be 
possible when national interests coincide, though unlikely.
88
 
Moreover, Hoffmann states that proponents of intergovernmentalism proposed that 
states were uniquely powerful for two reasons: because they possessed legal sovereignty; and 
they had political legitimacy as the only democratically elected stakeholders in the integration 
process.  Therefore, unlike what Hoffmann thought, governments had much more autonomy 
than in the view of neofunctionalists.
89
 Different scholars like Milward (2000) had argued 
that it was the EU national governments who have played a great role in the historical 
antecedents of the EU which have reinforced and enhanced its integration.
90
 
It is also known that the policies of the European Union have been positively 
reinforcing and re-asserting the theories of intergovernmentalism with regards to neither 
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compromising nor diminishing the values of national sovereignty of member states. 
Intergovernmentalism supports that European integration is driven by the interest and actions 
of the European Nation States. According to this interpretation, the main aim of governments 
is to protect their geopolitical interests such as national security, defense, and national 
sovereignty.
91
 
This is why this thesis uses the intergovernmentalism framework as the main 
framework to assess the EU’s energy policy.  To understand the differences between the 
national preferences of the member states, Germany, France and the UK’s preferences will be 
explained, as they are the Big Three and the relatively more powerful members shaping EU 
policies. This chapter also analyses the preferences of the Central and Eastern European 
states on energy policies as well because they seem to have the highest degree of dependence 
on imported sources of energy.  
2.2. Energy Policies of the Three Locomotives of Europe   
When European energy security is examined, only looking at the EU’s energy policies 
is not enough to understand the issue. For that reason, states like France, Germany, and the 
UK which act as the locomotive of the EU, should be studied. France and Germany are two 
countries which have the largest role in the creation of the union. When economic and 
political power is concerned, the UK and Italy should also be looked at beside Germany and 
France.  
To begin with France, it pushes for a European Energy Policy (EPP).
92France’s 
energy profile is mixed, because it exports large amounts of electricity to neighboring 
countries and also to Spain and Italy. Moreover, it relies mainly on nuclear energy. İts import 
are oil and gas from both European and external energy providers. Looking at its oil imports, 
they come from a number of suppliers, basically the Middle East and North Africa (51%), 
North Sea (32%) and Russia (only 23%).
93
 France has also diversified its gas imports which 
come from Russia (22%), Algeria (16%), Norway (35%) and the Netherlands (21%). Nuclear 
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energy is a key source for France’s consumption as it accounts for 41% of its total energy 
supply.
94
  
Secondly, Germany depends mostly on Russia for energy resources as one third of its 
oil and 35% of its gas. It continues to invest in coal-based electricity generation to decrease 
its imported energy consumption.
95
 Moreover, around 12% of Germany’s total energy 
consumption is supplied by nuclear energy generation within the country.
96
 However, there is 
recently a very controversial discussion within the country about withdrawing from the 
nuclear industry in the long run because of environmental concerns. The concern is that if 
Germany totally gives up nuclear energy, it will become more dependent on energy imports. 
Moreover, the special partnership between Germany and Russia regarding energy trade 
shows the tendency to further develop its independent long-term contracts with Russia.
97
 
Finally, The UK has been a self-sufficient country regarding energy and also it is a net 
exporter of oil. Additionally, the UK exports gas to other EU member states.  The problem 
for the UK is the sustainability of its production, because its oil resources are about to 
become exhausted. Its indigenous gas resources are similarly running out so the UK is forced 
to start importing natural gas.
98
 Hence, despite a set of pipeline projects, the UK wants to 
increase its access to gas fields in Norway and continental Europe. These considerations have 
created the idea that the continuation of the current energy policy would threaten the UK’s 
energy security and force it to change its stance toward a common EU-wide external energy 
policy. 
Three locomotives of Europe will be observed in detailed in next sections in order to 
see their current situation and stance in the energy issue.  
2.2.1. Germany   
Today, Germany is the largest economy of Europe and the fifth largest economy in 
the world. The country that is like the locomotive of the EU, gives priority on energy issues. 
How to provide energy is the first concern of Germany today. For that reason, Germans 
invest more on renewable energy sources and nurture their relations with countries who 
produce hydro-carbon energy sources. According to International Energy Agency, the total 
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energy need of Germany is 350 million equivalent values to oil. One third of this need is oil, 
and natural gas and coal are nearly 22-23% in total.
99
 The storage capacity is also very 
important for the energy security. In 2006 the number of storage facilities of the EU was 127, 
with a maximum working volume of 75 bcm, on the other hand, in 2009 the EU reached 79 
bcm capacity with 130 storage facilities. Coming to 2010, 6 storage facilities were closed 
such as one in Germany.
100
 
Additionally, industrial producers in Germany, the major players in the German 
energy industry should be mentioned, since they are developing some strategies. In order to 
help replacing nuclear power, they are racing to install huge wind farms far off the German 
coast in the North Sea; also, new transmission infrastructure is now being planned to get the 
power to Germany’s industrial regions. Moreover, companies like Siemens, GE, and RWE 
are searching for ways to remain factories humming during lulls in wind and solar power.
101
 
 
Figure 2.1: Energy Production of Germany, 2009 
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Germany provides 65% of its coal needs from its own resources whereas for natural 
gas and oil, it is dependent on outside sources (for oil: 100%; for natural gas: 80% 
dependency rate).
102
 A high dependency rate like this makes diversification of resources hard. 
Therefore, neighbors like Norway and Russia as energy-producing countries become the most 
important suppliers of Germany. Germany imports 40% of its natural gas and oil from Russia 
and nearly 30% of natural gas and oil from Norway. 
103
 For example, Germany has its own 
direct pipeline connection from Russia, the Nord Stream, with a capacity of 27.5 bcm of 
natural gas flowing since November 2011. The second connection from Russia to Germany, 
Nord Stream II, is being build which is thought to become operational at the end of 2012 with 
the same capacity of 27.5 bcm of natural gas.
104
 
Looking at these facts, Germany also has energy security concerns, not unlike the 
European Union. According to the Federal Economy and Technology Ministry, Germany has 
set forth the following goals: energy sufficiency, securing supplies, and environmental 
harmony for the energy policy. 
105
German energy bureaucracy prioritizes the securing of 
supplies, because of the potential competition between the USA, the EU, and Asia on the 
supplies of Russia, Caspian area and the Middle East. For that reason, the German 
government wants to make investment in those supplier countries and, conversely, wants 
them to make investments in Germany. This is particularly true for Russia. After 2006, 
tension due to gas between Russia and Ukraine grew, and Germany tried to strengthen its 
relations with Russia and started the North Stream line. 
106
German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
also stated that the Nord Stream gas pipeline had found, “solutions that give Poland major 
security.” At this point, Germany and Poland have had on-going disagreements relating to 
Nord Stream, as Poland has set off on plans to attempt to increase its energy security. 
However, as was stated, Germany does not want to deteriorate the relation with Russia, 
especially on the energy issue.   
 
2.2.2. France  
France is in the same situation as Germany with regards to energy issues; it is 
dependent on outside sources too. It is the second country in the EU that needs the most 
energy, after Germany. Its energy need is equal to 272 million tons of oil. However, France 
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differentiates itself from Germany because it has nuclear energy is able to decreases its 
energy dependency on outside countries. It is the second nuclear energy-producing country 
after the USA, and its natural gas need is no more that 15% of its energy needs. France 
satisfies 40% of this need through Norway and it also imports gas from Russia and Holland. 
Moreover, France diversifies its supplier sources and takes liquid natural gas (LNG) from 
Algeria, Nigeria, and Egypt. Beside natural gas, it also imports oil from Saudi Arabia, 
Norway, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Russia. Therefore, it can be said that France has succeeded 
in diversifying its energy sources.  
Figure 2.2: Energy Production of France, 2009 
 France emphasizes its source diversification and it uses electricity for industrial use 
from nuclear energy, so its situation in the case of an energy crisis will be better and less 
fragile than Germany. This situation brings France a more secure position about energy 
interests compared with Germany and Italy. It is known that investments on nuclear energy 
should be lessened according to the EU norms. 
107
However, it is unlikely that France will 
leave its nuclear energy advantage. The French Minister in charge of Industry, Energy and 
Digital Economy, Eric Besson, stated that French historical choices in favor of nuclear 
energy has led to an important reduction of the oil import bill and has increased the country’s 
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independence, and the share of oil in French final consumption went down from around 65 to 
45% between 1973 and today.   
As noted, nuclear energy is a crucial source for France’s consumption that accounts for 
41% of its total energy supply.
108
 Since the first oil shock in 1973, France continues to its 
nuclear capability to be able to respond to possible future cuts from energy exporters. This is 
the point where France differentiates itself from other EU member countries. As a result of 
challenges like Russian gas supply distruptions to transit countries and so to the European 
markets, different French governments refuse to close the existing nuclear stations in France 
and want to preserve advances in nuclear power. A popular French riposte to the question of 
why they have so much nuclear energy should be mentioned here: "No oil, no gas, no coal, 
no choice."
109
 
Additionally, France wanted to do business with Libya in areas including nuclear energy. 
French Industry Minister Christian Estrosi signed an agreement in 2010 with his Libyan 
counterpart on trade cooperation, and also had talks with Libyan Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi 
Ali al-Mahmoudi. "This agreement will lead to strategic cooperation with Libya in the areas 
of transport, health, construction, oil and gas and peaceful nuclear energy," he has said.
110
 
However, as it is mentioned in the previous sections, there was a civil movement in Libya, as 
a result of “Arab Spring.” The production in Libya is about to increase after the regime 
changes. Libya’s infrastructure is able to supply a maximum volume of 12.5 bcm/y to the EU 
countries.
111
 Therefore, new projects and developments are absolutely required to meet the 40 
bcm target of Libya by 2030.
112
 Especially, after the civil unrest in 2011, Libya is now at the 
recovering stage. If the production of Libyan gas keeps stable, the volumes for exports are 
likely to continue at the current level. With regards to these predictions, these are all 
advantage for France. 
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2.2.3. The United Kingdom 
The UK is different from France and Germany because it has been self-sufficient for 
their energy needs for a long time. Its need for energy is equal to 230 million tons of oil, 
which correspond to 2,5% of the world’s energy consumption. In the past, The UK has been 
more self-sufficient country in terms of energy. The UK exports gas to other EU member 
states and moreover, some UK governments have supported the nuclear energy. Still, there is 
a problem for the UK which is the sustainability of its production. It means that its oil 
resources are rapidly becoming exhausted. Additionally, its indigenous gas resources are 
running out, so the UK is forced to begin importing natural gas. It has a set of pipeline 
projects to increase its access to gas fields in Norway and continental Europe.  
Figure 2.3: Energy Production of the UK, 2009 
 
 
Unfortunately, the resources of the country in the North Sea are decreasing 
dramatically.
113
 Energy diversification breakdown of the UK is the following: Oil (38%), 
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natural gas (35%), coal (18%), and nuclear energy (8%).
114
 Although the UK has seemed to 
be successful in diversifying its energy resources, decreasing resources cannot meet 
increasing consumption. For that reason, the UK has collaborated with Norway for natural 
gas and it has also linked to European gas networks through Belgium.
115
 It also imports liquid 
gas from Algeria and Qatar by LNG terminals.  
The energy security of the UK is emphasized in A White Paper on Energy (2007). The 
government policies mostly related to decreasing carbon emission through disposition of 
energy and securing cheaper and clean energy supplies. Considering these two points, the UK 
is different from other member states in the EU on the energy issue, since its movements are 
more efficient that other members as a result of its relations with transatlantic countries. 
These considerations have brought to the understanding that the continuation of the current 
energy policy would threaten the UK’s energy security and force it to change its stance about 
a concerted EU-wide external energy policy. 
Additionally, The UK looks to have some problems with the EU’s new deals 
regarding parts of common energy policy such as energy efficiency deal. The government is 
said to water down the EU energy efficiency deal. However, the energy and climate change 
secretary, Davey, claimed at tit was a victory for the UK and action on climate change, and 
he denied the claim that the UK had watered down the agreement. He said:  "The deal which 
has now been agreed is good for the UK and for the EU as a whole and maintains the EU's 
position as a global leader in tackling climate change. It signals a step-change in energy 
efficiency, and for the first time sets legally binding energy saving targets, which at a time of 
economic challenge will help improve the EU's competitiveness and boost growth."”116Te 
government’s statements look like as they are for a common energy policies, but it is still 
unquestionable that they are for or against a common policy. 
2.3. Central Eastern European Countries 
When new member states from Central and Eastern Europe completed their accession 
to the EU, the EU had incorporated countries due to security concerns and interests. 
Especially the debate of the EU energy security has gained new momentum by the accession 
of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in 2004, since CEECs were notably 
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different from old member states. This act became most evident in relation to the issue of 
external supply, where the new members have to engage with an overdependence on one 
source of oil and, especially, natural gas. It is claimed that the reliance of the CEECs on 
Russian pipelines brought Russia precisely back into the European security debates, and it 
would not be too inconsequential. Moreover, there were problematic issues and hostile 
relations between some of the new members and Russia, so the securitization of EU energy 
policy looks like a natural development for the EU. 
CEE countries still depend on Russia for their energy imports; Russia provides natural 
gas to these countries at much lower levels than the international gas markets. Russia’s 
decision to apply different price rises to these countries makes those angry that have had to 
defray the cost of this Russian policy. Energy disputes between Russia and transit countries 
really brought to the surface the exposure of the EU and CEE countries to supply security 
threats. 
It would surely be too simplistic to put the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
into a homogenous group; however they can be roughly separated into two groups with 
regards to their foreign policy behavior. Poland and the Baltic states usually promote the 
eastern orientation of EU foreign policy and the close maintenance to the American position 
in global crises. On the other hand, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia are 
showing the same tendencies as the EU mainstream.
117
 These separations are also evident in 
relation to Russia: “Other than Poland, the Central European countries tend to have relatively 
trouble-free relations with Moscow. Some, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, have 
recently been mimicking the bigger EU countries by forging closer bilateral ties with Russia.” 
118
 At this point, the intergovernmental process can be seen as the smaller states forging 
alliances with the larger states. As of 1 January 2011, the EU had 124 storage facilities, and 
they have a maximum working volume of 86 bcm.
119
 Table includes only the selected 
countries from CEECs and they have different levels as noted.  
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Table 2.1: Natural Gas Underground Storages at 1 January 2011 
Countries Number of Storage 
facilities 
Maximum Working 
Volume (mm3) 
Maximum 
Withdrawal Capacity 
(mm3/ day) 
Czech Republic 8 3127 52 
Hungary 5 6330 72 
Poland 7 1640 32 
Slovak Republic 1 2785 39 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 
Romania 8 2760 28 
 
The new members are almost fully dependent on Russia unlike old EU member states. 
For example: Slovakia, which imports 97 % of oil and 98 % of natural gas from Russia and 
also depends on it for supplies of nuclear fuel, is a special case, but even the rest of the 
countries are in fairly similar situations.
120
Moreover, Eastern European countries are also 
deeply affected by Russian companies’ “pipeline politics”. This can be regarded as another 
controlling mechanism for Russia in order to shape the politics of the Eastern European 
countries according to its wishes. The Russian-German agreement on building a gas pipeline 
through the Baltic Sea indicates that the new route will ultimately bypass Poland, and this 
country will be in a strategically weakened position after the placement of this gas pipeline. 
Actually, it is not surprising that Poland has become one of the staunchestdefendants of a 
common EU energy policy, and moreover, it has called on solidarity among the member 
states to resist the threat coming from Russian behavior. The other CEECs, such as Hungary, 
have not decided for counteracting but rather bandwagoning when its Prime Minister agreed 
to the Russian proposal that the Blue Stream pipeline would be extended to Hungary. The 
offer was accomplished through a promise by Gazprom to build a large gas-storage facility in 
the country which could become the hub for all of Central Europe. This Hungarian decision 
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brought a serious blow to the EU common project which should follow nearly the same 
transport route.
121
 
The states of Central and Eastern Europe are in a paradoxical situation; caught 
between historically motivated suspicion of Russian motives and at the same times their 
almost complete dependency on Russian oil and gas. It is clear that Eastern Europe is not in a 
position to become a conclusive factor in the debates on EU energy security. Even though the 
CEECs would exhibit a united front, they would have to compete for their vision with 
countries which have drawn their attention to North Africa (France, Italy) or the North Sea 
(Great Britain, Scandinavian states), or whose relationship with Russia runs on a completely 
different track (Germany).
122
 Beside this fact, since Russia and its behavior is a challenge for 
the rest of the EU, the CEECs can bring some leverage in influencing the EU energy security. 
While they are caught in a dilemma because they do not trust Russia historically, they need 
Russia for their energy security. This is the main reason they are looking for ways to reduce 
their dependence on the Russians. In order to explain CEECs’ role in the energy security, 
some selected countries will be mentioned briefly in the following part.  
2.3.1. Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic', a landlocked country in Central Europe, is bordered by Poland 
to the northeast, Slovakia to the east, Austria to the south, and Germany to the west and 
northwest. Today, gas consumption in the Czech Republic increased by approximately 10  
percent considering past years. According to the trading companies, the total volume of 
imported gas was 8.3 percent higher than  in  2009.
123
  Actually, supplies  from  the  
European  Union  and  Russia  were  used  more  than  in  the previous years,  due to imports 
from Norway. It is to be mentioned that not all of the imported gas was consumed in the 
Czech Republic; a certain part of this gas was intended for foreign customers.
124
 
Timothy Boon von Ochssée and Coby van der Linde have expressed Russian threat 
about dependency as: 
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“the ‘old’ European allies seek improved ties with Russia in order to secure long-term 
energy interests, examples of which include Germany  and France, but also the Netherlands 
and Italy. The ‘new’ European allies such as Poland, the Czech Republic seek to distance 
themselves from Moscow to the farthest extent possible, to the effect of wishing to eliminate 
their dependence on Russian energy.”125 
From this quote, the position of Czech Republic with regards to energy and energy 
security issues can be clearly understood. The Czech Republic experienced shortages of 50% 
of its oil deliveries from Russia after the accession.
126
 These admitted on the same day as the 
Czech Republic signed a bilateral treaty with the United States which allows the latter to 
place parts of an anti-missile defense system on the former’s soil, a deal strongly opposed by 
Russia. 
Czech Republic also concentrated on renewable resources and electricity. The country 
is cooperating with Germany, moreover the Czech Prime Minister, Nečas, has declared that  
“Our policy is to strengthen the Czech power distribution network, involving a relatively 
significant investment over the coming years. The way forward is not to separate our systems, 
but instead to connect them,”127 Angela Merkel, the Germans also mention about their 
content about the issue and she said: “We are very pleased that the Czech Republic does not 
want to separate, and is working towards an integrated electricity market.”128  
2.3.2. Hungary 
The CEECs are to a much larger extent dependent on Russian gas compared to their 
western counterparts. Even though they have substantial amounts of domestic coal reserves, 
they do not actively use their full potential, because coal is no longer seen as a viable energy 
source because of its ecological harmfulness. As a result of it, gas is imported in large 
quantities. Importing gas creates complete dependence of some countries on Russian gas.  
Hungary is located at the center of Europe who has borders with Romania, Austria, 
and Ukraine. Its population is nearly 10 million and it has relatively high consumption of 
natural gas. Hungary has the fourth largest share of natural gas in the total primary energy 
consumption after the UK, Netherlands, and Italy. Moreover, it imports more than 70 percent 
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of its gas from Russia. There is a decreasing tendency in the indigenous production resulting 
in growing dependency, so it is essential for Hungary to diversify its sources of supply as it is 
highly dependent on Russian supplies.
129
 Concerning to its dependence on Russia, energy 
policy in Hungary made effort to create a balance between its various objectives, regarding 
the concepts Hungary shares with the International Energy Agency, and with regards to EU 
legislation. According to the Hungarian National Energy Strategy 2030, the country is 
thought to consume around 17 bcm of natural gas by the year 2030.
130
 
Figure 2.4 : Natural gas imports of Hungary 
 
 
 
Hungary's gas dependence is quite astounding. The share of natural gas in primary 
energy consumption is nearly 40% within the EU. Imports come from Russia and in line with 
the contract between Gazprom and Hungarian Energy Company MOL; Hungary is expected 
to get an annual 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas by 2015. 
131
 Theoretically, the HAG 
pipeline, connecting Győr in Western Hungary to Baumgarten in Austria, would actually help 
diversify imports. However, this could only supply Russian gas, at a significant premium 
compared to direct delivery. Hungary could also connect to the gas pipeline which intersects 
Slovakia; even this also would only supply Russian gas.  
Finally, Hungary is an important natural gas consuming country among the EU states.  
The consumption of natural gas trend is likely to increase, whereas, as it is the case for most 
of the EU states, the domestic production is decreasing. Rely on imports particularly from 
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Russia, Hungary desires to diversify its sources and supports projects that will supply 
additional gas to the CEECs. 
2.3.3. Slovak Republic 
The Slovak Republic is a perfect example of what can happen to a country when it 
doesn’t pay attention to its own energy security. Slovakia has historically been one of the 
most fragile countries in Europe in terms of energy security. There are many reasons for this 
situation, such as the timing of energy privatization and the general inability of its 
government to transform its declarations into deeds with a prioritization on this issue. U.S. 
Ambassador Theodore Sedgwick mentioned that Slovakians painfully aware that nearly 100 
percent of Slovakia's energy supply comes from Russian fossil fuels. If nothing else, this 
nation needs to diversify its energy supply.
132
 
The primary aims of energy policy since 1993, when Slovakia seceded from the 
Czechoslovak federation, has been the creation of a new legal framework for the energy 
sector, an expansion of its domestic gas distribution network, and an increase in its transit 
capacity.
133
 Market building and regulatory aspects of the energy reform took place because 
of compliance with EU pre-accession pressures, but ameliorating supply security and 
emergency preparedness lagged behind. Slovakia’s energy intensity analyzed in comparison 
with its immediate neighbors was, until 2006, the highest in the region.
134
 Slovakia’s energy 
intensity was greater than that of the Czech Republic until roughly 2007. On the other hand, 
Hungary uses its energy more efficiently, and Poland less efficiently, in terms of energy 
intensity.  
According to the Eurostat 2009 statistics, the country imports most of its oil and gas, 
and almost all of its primary coal energy sources.
135
 Slovakia also imports all of its nuclear 
fuel for electricity generation. Nevertheless, the critical fact, which was seen during the 
January 2009 gas crisis, is the lack of diversification in the sources and transit routes of 
Slovakia’s imports. All of Slovakia’s nuclear fuel is brought from Russia. All of its pre-2009 
gas imports came from Russia’s Gazprom, and about three quarters of its imported oil is from 
Russia in spite of the existence of the alternative oil pipeline Adria (from the Croatian 
                                                          
132
 Slovakia’s energy concers not far from our own. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-keane/america-oil-costs-_b_875966.html. 
133
Nosko, Andrej & Sevce, Peter, The Evolution of Energy Security in the Slovak Repuplic, 29 September 2010, 
retrieved from: http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=262:the-evolution-of-
energy-security-in-the-slovak-republic&catid=110:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=366. 
134
Ibid. 
135
 Slovakia Gross Inland Consumption, data by Eurostat 2009. 
 55 
 
Adriatic port of Omisalj).
136
 The worrying sign is that its imports rely on a single import 
route via Ukraine. This puts Slovakia in a very problematic position, not only with supply 
security risks, but also regarding the premium price customers in Slovakia are paying for 
their energy resources. However, according to the Minister of Economy of the Slovak 
Republic Tomáš Malatinský Slovakia argued on 29 Novemner 2012 that: "Slovakia currently 
has sufficient capacity gas storage facilities, which together with interconnections with 
neighboring countries allows a reliable and safe supply of gas," at The 6th Annual Energy 
Conference - The Common EU Energy Policy and the Energy Security of Slovakia.
137
 
Actually, energy market in Slovakia has problems due to a lack of publicly available 
figures and information. Considering the availability of natural gas for public use, Slovakia is 
second country of EU 27. According to International Energy Agency (IEA), energy mix of 
Slovakia consists of natural gas (30 %), nuclear energy (22 %) and crude oil (21 %).
138
 
Additionally, the national target of Slovakia on field of exploiting renewable energy sources 
is to reach the 14 % share in general energy mix by 2020.
139
  
Additionally, The Chairman of the Slovak Parliament Pavol Paškaand his counterpart 
from Turkey Cemil Çiçek met on 12 November 2012 to discuss opportunities for deepening 
economic cooperation, specifically in the energy sector.
140
 Both countries depend on import 
of primary energy sources. Considering Turkey plays a crucial part in biggest pipeline 
projects which might increase the energy security of the EU such as South Stream, Nabucco 
or TAP, Slovak Republic see a potential for energy cooperation with Turkey.
141
 Cemil Çiçek 
stated in the meeting that: “Turkey is interested in deepened the cooperation not only in the 
economic and trade area, but also in the area of political dialogue, as well as in the energy 
area. Energy is a vital issue for both countries,“ 142 
2.3.4. Romania 
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Romania which has borders with Serbia and Hungary is the ninth largest country and 
seventh most populous country in the European Union.
143
 Its reliance on foreign supplies, 
specifically for gas, is lower than the EU average because of its own reserves.
144
 The country 
has the largest oil and gas reserves in the Central Eastern Europe region.  
The country consumed 13,8 bcm of natural gas in 2011.
145
 11 bcm of this amount was 
its domestic resources and 2,81 bcm was imported from Russia in 2011.
146
 The gas 
consumption of Romanis is rising, with regards to the huge reserves and the availability of 
the supplies in the country. However, natural gas reserves is decreasing. It has 0,1 tcm of 
proven natural gas reserves in 2011, compared to2010 in which that of 0,6 bcm.
147
 
 
Figure 2.5: Total primary energy consumption of Romania (2010) 
 
 
Source: Energy Delta Institute
148
 
 
According to Energy Delta Institute figure, natural gas has 35 percent share in the 
total primary energy consumption, whereas oil and coal has 26 percent and 18 percent. It is 
expected that gas consumption will rise more than 16 bcm in 2035 according to the IEA, 
Golden Age of Gas (GAS) ratios.
149
 
As noted,  Romania produces more than 80 percent of its demand domestically, so it 
has not much concern about supply security. It produced 11 bcm of natural gas indigenously 
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in 2011, whereas its production was between 12-12,5 bcm/y between 2001-2009.
150
  
Considering gas imports, Romania is 15 percent dependent on imported gas butthe country is 
only dependent on Russia for its gas imports.
151
 Moreover, it is known that as a result of long term contract, 
Gazprom will continue supplying gas to Romania until 2030.
152
Eventhough Romania is not highly 
dependent on imports, it could benefit from diversifying its supplier countries since its 
national production is decreasing and more imports will be needed. Maybe, for that reason,  
Romanian President Traian Basescu has said the EU needs to send positive signals to Turkey. 
He mentioned that: “We do believe the Black Sea carries great potential for cooperation 
involving all interested countries, from the region and beyond, but it also faces a range of 
specific energy-related opportunities and challenges. Wind, hydro and solar energy could 
make the region a key element of Europe’s energy strategy.”153 
2.4.Conclusion 
Considering the EU security concept, it is evident that the EU energy policy is a 
complex issue which involves many different economic, environmental, technological, as 
well as political and security aspects. Security of external supply, which is intensely debated 
in connection with the EU eastern enlargement, is only one of the components in the whole 
spectrum. Nonetheless, it is a crucial part of it, and Russia is the most prominent supplier of 
oil and natural gas for the Union. From this point of view, the connection between 
enlargement and the formulation of the EU’s energy security concept exists specifically due 
to the members’ almost complete dependence on Russian resources. The countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe have only a marginal influence on the formulation of the EU energy 
security strategy. They can only use the existing suspicions against Russian motives to 
support the framing of a truly common EU energy policy. If this policy was successfully 
established, it would bring long-terms benefits to all parties.  
Russia can potentially control domestic gas supply, separate EU member states and 
offer to sell to those who can pay higher prices. Russia’s interest is to increase the high price 
for gas to control the upper and lower streams including the gas field, as well as 
transportation. Thus, every player has to depend on Russia. For instance, the Czech Republic 
has oil pipelines from Germany providing 20 percent of their energy needs. Thus, this 
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country is somewhat independent from Russia and Russia, in turn, deals with the Czech 
Republic in a quite amicable manner. The solution to the energy problem is not to have many 
weak players deal with Russia, but rather one big player. Though the North Stream project is 
somehow like the energy NATO initiated by Poland, it is not the right way to approach this 
issue. The EU plus eastern EU countries can be one big player with one common EU policy. 
However, before the EU common policy, each country can set up the cooperation 
mechanism. Moreover, the same rule should be introduced to Russian companies to avoid a 
monopoly. Transparency is also crucial. Democratic control should be introduced to societies 
in eastern countries. Otherwise, the possible outcome could be that all the pipelines are 
owned by Russian companies.  
In assessing the EU security concept, one must realize that the EU energy policy is a 
complex issue that encompass many different economic, environmental, technological, as 
well as political and security aspects. Security of external supply, which is the most hotly 
debated topic in connection with the EU eastern enlargement, is one of the components in the 
whole spectrum. Nevertheless, it is an important part of it, and Russia stands out as the most 
prominent supplier of oil and natural gas for the Union. From this point of view, the 
connection between the enlargement and the formulation of the EU’s energy security concept 
clearly exists, as the members’ dependence on Russian resources is almost complete. Beyond 
this factual link, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have only a marginal influence 
on the formulation of the EU energy security strategy. They can nevertheless use the existing 
suspicions against Russian motives to support the framing of a truly common EU energy 
policy. If successfully established, such a policy would bring long-terms benefits to all parties 
concerned, including Russia. 
In short, it can be said that energy and energy security occupies a big place in the 
members states’ political and economic agenda. Moreover, they see this issue as a union 
issue, given that policies are not commonly held by all member states, and so the principle of 
supranationality does not work in the energy security issue. This situation affects both 
common energy policy and foreign policy of the EU. The energy security issue places the 
European Union in a fragile position.  
As Moravcsik argues at his exposition;  
“…is that the broad lines of European integration since 1955 reflect three factors: 
patterns of commercial exchange, the relative bargaining power of 
nationalgovernments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate 
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commitments. Most fundamental of these was commercial interest. European 
integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who 
consistently pursued economic interests – primarily the commercialinterests of 
powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of 
ruling governmental coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural 
incentives in the global economy.When such interests converged, integration 
advanced.” 154 
This view is certainly true for the energy policy, since the member state preferences 
matter the most in shaping the EU’s energy policy. The EU member states have different 
interests and needs vis a vis both energy and their reliance on Russia, this prevents the EU 
from formulating  a coherent, credible energy policy even though the Commission has 
initiated attempts to build common strategies for the EU energy security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
154
Moravcsik, A. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 60 
 
 
CHAPTER 3- THE CRITICAL ROLE OF TURKEY IN EUROPEAN ENERGY 
SECURITY  
The major natural gas suppliers and the possible future suppliers to the EU are mainly 
the neighbours of Turkey and also the transport routes to the EU is likely to cross over 
Turkey. The EU has a developed economy and compared to other regions, its energy need is 
increasing very fast. However, the EU cannot diversify its energy resources as it is desired. In 
addition to the diversification problem, there is a security problem with the energy issue in 
the EU. Russia is the very first energy source for the EU, but it is not a sustainable supplier. 
There is a political equivocacy in Russia and as a state; it has an inclination to use its energy 
ammunition in the political arena. Therefore, these moves increase the questions that arise 
and the disbelief in relations between the EU and Russia.
155
 This chapter sets out the potential 
and critical role of Turkey as a transit state for the EU, with particular attention the transport 
routes crossing over Turkey. Additionally, how much this role is effective for Turkey’s 
potential membership to the EU is also mentioned.  
 
3.1. Potential Role of Turkey 
Turkey comes to the forefront as a possible stabilizer of the Russian and North 
African energy lines. Its geopolitical position becomes increasingly critical and important for 
the EU. Its role is very important as a gateway through which natural gas can be transported 
to the European Union. This role is becoming increasingly important as the European Union 
deals with the interrelated problems of ensuring energy security and the provision of energy 
supplies from multiple sources at competitive prices. Moreover, Turkey is a net energy 
importer itself and a major market for regional producers. Turkey has the ability and 
willingness to develop major transit systems for gas as well as oil, so its role becomes 
important as a country enabling hydrocarbon resource to access European markets by 
pipeline from such diverse regions as the Caspian, Central Asia, the Gulf, and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
Considering Turkey’s special role as a transit state, actually, Turkey is not a 
hydrocarbon resource rich country. Therefore, it uses high levels of fosil fuels. However, the 
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conventional hydrocarbon reserves of Turkey is insignificant except for coal. Despite this 
disadvantage, Turkey is located in between energy producers who have significant volumes 
of natural gas. With numbers, world’s 71,8 percent of proven gas reserves and 72.7 percent of 
proven oil reserves are located around Turkey.
156
Turning to the EU, as a biggest energy 
consumer in the world, mostly of gas, lies in the west. As a result, Turkey is thought to play 
the role of an energy hub and a corridor between the supplier countries and the consumer 
countries. Moreover, it is stated in Turkey’s Strategic Plan for 2010-2014, the long-term aim 
of Turkey is to become “… country into an energy hub and terminal by using the geo-
strategic position effectively within the framework of the regional cooperation processes”.157 
It is understood from the statement that Turkey’s ambition is to become a state of natural gas 
to Europe. Additionally, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey, Taner Yıldız 
told more about the situation as: “…the energy resources in eastern countries through 
actualizing the geographical features that will enable transportation of such resources to 
western countries and the projects that will cover the commercial and political dimension of 
the involvement. The geo-strategic position of our country has been rendered with 
comprehensive and strategic studies and Turkey has acquired an identity of an “energy 
corridor” and also has become the new and the critical actor of the multinational oil and 
natural gas pipeline projects and the international energy arena.”158 
Having said that, this chapter is aimed at explaining the critical place of Turkey in the 
European energy security and emphasizes its geographical role for pipelines and new energy 
related projects, like the Nabucco streamline. Although the central role that Nabucco plays 
has diminished for multiple reasons since 2009, such as the uncertainty over European 
demand, the uncertainty about the supplies, Turkey’s geopolitical importance and the 
possiblity of being an energy corridor is still significant. It is because of the fact that the 
strategic importance of Turkey gained much more importance after the U.S. support for the 
pipeline developments in the Caspian region in the1990s. Moreover, the political and 
economic development and independence of the post-Soviet states was significant for the 
Washington and still is. For that reason, the EU and the U.S. show support to Turkey’s aim as 
to become the “fourth artery” to the EU. However, still, there are some challenges with 
regards to its important role beside the advantages which will be explained in further 
sections.  
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Turkey is located in a place where most of energy routes intersect. In the north of Turkey, 
is located Russia who is like the crown of many resources. To the south and east, there are 
Middle Eastern countries that have the 65% of the petrol and natural gas 
resources.
159
Additionally, there are Caspian region countries that have proven to be very 
crucial countries for the world energy resources. For instance, Kazakhstan is estimated to 
have greater oil resources, more so than Iran that is the biggest oil producer in the 
world.
160
Considering all those countries around Turkey, 72% of the oil reserves of the world 
are deployed around Turkey.
161
 Table shows the reserves, the production, the consumption 
and the import export balance of the countries around Turkey’s vicinity. 
Table 3.1: The natural gas producers in Turkey’s neighborhood 
 
Source: BP, 2012. 
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Although Turkey holds a very critical place in terms of energy, this advantage has not 
been used to secure relations with Europe. This is related to the fact that Turkey has no 
energy resources of its own; instead, it has only the advantage of being close to the oil 
producer and natural gas owner countries. However, how much Turkey uses this advantage is 
in question for politics. The Turkish application to the EU for full membership goes all the 
way back to the 1959s.  Ankara government applied to the then EEC for membership in 1959 
following the Greek application. The Agreement Creating an Association between the 
Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community, Ankara Agreement, was signed 
on 12 September 1963. Agreement entered into force on 1 December 1964 and its aim was to 
secure Turkey’s full membership in the EEC through the establishment in the phases of a 
customs union that would provide an instrument for integration between the EEC and Turkey. 
The Ankara Agreement contemplated the progressive creation a Customs Union that would 
make two parties closer in economic and trade matters. Following this process, the EEC 
would give Turkey financial assistance. On 13 November 1970, the Additional Protocol 
deployed in a detailed fashion how the Customs Union would be created.  Turkish application 
was not evaluated with the Ankara agreement but with Treaty of Rome, and this is actually 
the normal procedure. The decision underlined Turkey eligibility for membership however it 
required a depth analysis until the emergence of a more favorable environment. It is also 
stated that a detailed cooperation program was needed for both sides in order to achieve 
integration and added that the Customs Union had to be completed in 1995. Since that time 
many steps have taken but what about energy issue? From 1995 to 2000 the role of energy in 
the relations between Turkey and Europe has been nearly zero. European states are very 
dependent on outside countries for the oil and natural gas issue. On the other side, Turkey is 
surrounded by energy resources; however, it had no important role in the energy issue for a 
long time. Energy line went through countries like Russia and Algeria by following routes 
other than Turkey and reached to Western Europe. When the 2000s came, Turkey’s role on 
European energy security became increasingly important as a result of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 90s and then, the developments in the Caspian region due to the dissolution. 
It became possible to access to Caspian resources with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Importantly, the countries in the region, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan are really rich regarding to natural gas and oil resources. Moreover, the total 
proven reserves natural gas of these countries is about 29,1 tcm.
162
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The European Union shows that the union has given importance to Turkey about energy 
issue with a note prepared by European Parliament, called “EU- Turkey Relations in the Field 
of Energy”. In this paper, Turkey’s role as a partner of EU’s energy transit country, 
cooperation between EU and Turkey on energy and Turkey’s harmonization works in 
accordance with acquis was evaluated. In this paper, it is stated that:  
“The potential of Turkey to become an important country for oil and gas transit from 
Russia, the Caspian Sea region and the Persian Gulf adds to the strategic importance of 
Turkey to the EU.  Turkey also connects the EU with the Middle East and is an important 
player in the Mediterranean. In respect of energy, the role of Turkey is bound to even 
grow because of the increasing volumes of oil and gas that will transit through the 
country, from both Persian Gulf producers, the Caspian Sea and Russia. In any event, 
wider market integration, including energy trade, is and will be an important policy tool 
to secure energy flows.”163 
As it is understood from the passage, the EU had begun to prepare reports which 
emphasized the need for Turkey in the energy and energy security field. Recently, on 14 June 
2012, European Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger and Commissioner for 
Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle met with Turkish Minister for 
EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış and Energy Minister Taner Yildiz in 
Stuttgart in order to discuss enhanced energy relations with Turkey, in the framework of the 
positive agenda for Turkey. It is stated in the meeting that “Turkey and EU are partners in 
promoting the development of bidirectional pipeline connections around the Southern Black 
Sea, aimed at strengthening their security of supply.”164 
3.2. Russia and Turkey regarding the EU Energy Security  
European energy security and the role of Turkey can be analyzed in relation to Russia. 
However, it cannot be ignored that Russia is not enough by itself to provide European energy 
needs. Caspian and Middle East resources are needed too. 
165
 According to Roland Götz, the 
real problem in the future will not be the dependency on Russia, but instead whether Russian 
resources will suffice over time.
166
 Russia is also aware of this fact and for that reason, it has 
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made long term agreements in Central Asia and Caucasus.In this way, the gas sold to Europe 
will be provided from Caspian region. Nonetheless, Russian leaders try to persuade European 
officials that Russian gas reserves are enough. President Putin (March 2009) stated that 
Russia has the enough gas and oil for 100 years for both Russia and Europe.
167
 
It is clear that Russia will be the most important gas supplier of Europe; however, its 
market share can also decrease. Therefore, Russia tries to bind Turkish gas to itself in order to 
protect its market share. Additionally, it prevents new actors from entering the energy market 
and therefore, retains its advantage within the market. Moreover, Russia can have a problem 
within European market, since it wastes gas as a result of bad operations and use of old 
technology. Also, although Gazprom is viewed as a powerful player, it is not always directed 
well and efficiently as its competitors and makes really important strategic mistakes. 
When these points are considered, it is very for Turkey to transmit Caspian and 
Middle East energy resources to Europe. Therefore, the role of Turkey increases again with 
this reality, because Turkish routes can meet the needs that Russia cannot provide.  
As noted in the previous chapters, for the sake of the European energy security, the 
EU should find alternative sources of natural gas and should find new ways of transporting it 
in order to bring gas to the European territory.  Nor is this all, there are other energy related 
concerns in Europe with regards to the natural gas issue. This means that when the EU 
decreases its dependence on Russia, all concerns of the EU related to energy security will be 
solved. Actually, there many other issues like finding alternative resources other than gas and 
oil. However, dependence on Russia for natural gas is the very near future problem. 
Renewable alternative energy sources - solar energy, biodiesel, wind power, tidal power - are 
the best hope for a permanent cure to the energy crisis. Despite the fact that these energy 
sources are not yet fully developed, the EU should develop these alternative resources for 
energy security.  
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Figure3.1: Production of primary energy, EU-27, 2009 (% total, based on tonnes of oil 
equivalent) 
 
 
 
Moreover, energy security debates are mostly concentrated on Western and Central 
Europe, however, energy security of Eastern European countries, such as the Ukraine and 
Belarus, is also important. Today, European countries are 50% dependent on Russia for the 
gas. This percentage is nearly 100% for Eastern European countries as it is mentioned in the 
Chapter two. 
168
Their pipelines increase their bargaining power, but, still, they are not in a 
good position when compared to Russia. Russia uses the natural gas as a political trump card 
as it did with Georgia and Lithuania. 
169
 For instance, the Ukrainian crisis showed that 
Eastern European countries hold an important card: they are en-route of transit way.  Russia 
is aware of this situation and has worked on by-pass lines in order to lessen dependency on 
those countries. The North Stream line will be under the Baltic Sea to Germany so it will 
have reached consuming point. In this way, Baltic and Eastern European countries will be 
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bypassed and with the help of the underwater, their bargaining power rendered by their 
physical location will have lessened.  
By the same logic, South Stream Line will aim to bypass the Eastern European 
countries and reach Central Europe. It will pass under the Black Sea and reach Bulgaria, 
Greece, Austria and Hungary directly via two branches. Here, European dependency on 
Russia will increase and in potential opposition with Russia, Eastern European countries will 
be in a difficult situation.  
As a result, Turkey is entering the natural gas game because the energy routes that 
pass through Turkey will allow the EU to decrease their dependency on Russian resources. 
Therefore, Turkey can become the key actor in the energy security of Europe considering its 
geostrategic position, located between major energy producers in the Caspian Region, the 
Middle East, Russia, and major energy consumers in Europe. This reality again shows that 
Turkey has a value for the European Union. This is very important for the Turkish side too, 
since Turkey is a candidate country, since 1999. There are many obstacles for full 
membership but at least now, there is a material benefit in the area of energy security, which 
can open a new way for the accession process. It means that Turkey’s place in the energy 
security can serve positively for both Turkey and the EU, so the role of Turkey in the 
European energy security is very critical. After the agreement between the Turkish and Azeri 
authorities on the construction of the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline TANAP on Turkish 
territory, Günther Oettinger, the commissioner for energy, welcomed, on 21 November, said 
that Europe was one step closer to its objective of obtaining gas directly from Azerbaijan and 
other countries of the Caspian region.
170
 
3.3. The EU Dependence on Natural Gas 
Natural gas is and will be an important an energy source for the EU. Its share in the 
total primary energy consumption started to rise after 1990s.
171
Since that time, there was a 
dramatic increase in the natural gas consumption of the EU. Moreover, this trend is likely to 
continue. The EU's gas demand is expected to rise by about a quarter by 2030.
172
The figure 
below shows that the projected natural gas demand for the EU by 2020 will increase too. 
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Moreover, the IEA officials and the company officials like Enno Harks, CEO, BP-Germany, 
thinks that there is not a slowdown in gas consumption in the European Union.
173
 
The EU’s share of natural gas in total energy consumption is likely to increase from 
25 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2035.
174
 Probably, oil will again dominate the 
transportation sector (83 percent); whereas, natural gas will be widely preferred in industry 
and households. Looking at their share, natural gas placed 25 percent of the energy demand 
and oil’s share was 34 percent in 2009. Moreover, it is expected by IEA that the share of the 
natural gas in total primary energy demand will increase to 28 percent in 2025 and 30 percent 
in 2035, however, the share of oil will steadily decline  to 28 percent in 2025 and then 25 
percent in 2035.
175
 Eurogas Statistics 2011 states that the ratio of natural gas in primary 
energy demand of the EU was 25 percent and that of oil was 34 percent in 2010. It is 
predicted that natural gas consumption will rise by 5 percent, whereas oil consumption will 
decrease by 5 percent by 2035. In all predictions of Eurogas, compared to oil, natural gas 
consumption shows a regular growth pattern. To sum up, the natural gas consumption in the 
European Union is assumed to increase at a higher speed since it is clean and reserves are 
increasing in the global level with the help of technical develeopments. Therefore, 
considering the EU’s gren properties, natural gas will keep the significant preferences for the 
EU and is going to continue to add significantly to energy supply in the EU.
176
 
Figure 3.2: Projected natural gas demand for the EU by 2020  
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Source: Eurogas 
 
Today, the EU is supplying 40% of its gas demand domestically; nevertheless, the 
statistics show that these domestic resources will deplete gradually in a short period of 
time.
177
 So the imports of the Union will rise to nearly 80% by 2030. From the figure above it 
is quite sure that the EU’s import dependency is increasing continuously without any 
interruption. The ratio of 60 percent import dependency will expected to increase by 89 
percent that means indigenous production almost diminishes by 2030. However, these 
expectations can change if European unconventional sources are used. On the contrary, the 
EU will absolutely need more imported gas to meet the growing demand. As a result, the 
import dependency of the EU will increase and this will cause a strong bargaining chip for 
the supplier countries by reducing EU’s credibility in the long run. 
Figure 3.3: The EU Import Dependency from outside Europe  
 
 
 
Source: Eurogas
178
 
According to IEA, the import demand of the Union was 310 bcm in 2009 and will 
increase to 540 bcm in 2035. Additionally, the import dependence rate rises from 64 percent 
in 2009 to 86 percent in 2035 including the imports from Norway.
179
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With regards to suppliers, Russia, Norway, and Algeria supply 68.0% of the EU's 
natural gas and Russia has approximately 40% share of it.
180
 None of the European countries 
had worried about the reliance on Russian gas until 2006, during the first Ukrainian crises 
when Gazprom temporarily cutoff gas supply to Ukraine. It was not the 'core European states' 
who froze to death but the middle and East European countries like Hungary, Austria, 
Slovenia and many others. So from January 2007 onwards, they took measures to tackle this 
problem. The European Commission published its energy policy package in 2007, with the 
main priority determined to be the diversification of supply routes. They agreed on bringing 
Caspian and Central Asian gas through Russian territory until the Turkey-Greece 
interconnector inaugurated. But this interconnector remained at small amounts, so it was 
never as significant as the other supply routes. Therefore, a new plan has to be made in order 
to diversify the supply and to counter balance the Russian dominance over the European 
markets. 
3.3.1. Regional Gas Disposition 
Since its very beginning, the European Union has always been one of the biggest 
energy consumers in the world and it can be said that the EU has been the most adressing 
energy market for most of the suppliers. Actually, it is not wrong to say that this fact is 
changing nowadays due to China and India getting into the market gradually fast. Still, the 
EU will be expected to remain as one of the biggest consumers for a long period of time.
181
 
The reserves are very crucial for coutries as their available gas potential. The proven 
gas reserve conjectures are relied on some issues like technological developments, the current 
production of the country, the profitability of the future extraction and new discoveries.
182
 It 
means that eventhough  the country that does not have the necessary technology to extract it 
has gas resources, its resources is not considered as proven reserves. In this context, the EU 
has nearly 7.03 tcm of gas; however, only 3.3 tcm of it is classified as proven reserves.
183
  
As noted, Russia is the closest and the biggest natural gas market in Europe’s, but EU 
officials are risingly concerned against on Russian gas. The EU takes the highest volumes of 
Russian gas flows via Ukraine or Belarus and that makes the market unstable. When there is 
a dispute between Moscow and Kyiv or Minsk, it results in interruptions in the gas flow, as 
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was experienced in 2006 and 2009. Additionally, the South East European countries are very 
vulnerable to these fluctuations since their markets are highly dependent on Russian gas 
imports.  
 
Figure 3.4: Natural gas supplies to the EU, 2011 
 
 
Turning to Turkey, it lies adjacent to countries or regions who have some 71.8% of the 
world’s proven gas reserves and some 72.7% of the world’s proven oil reserves. Moreover, 
Turkey is the fifth largest primary energy and eighth largest natural gas consumer in 
Europe.
184
 The share of gas in general energy consumption is 30 percent; the share of coal 
and oil are 32 and 27 percent.
185
 Turkey utilizes 47.5 bcm of natural gas in 2011 and exported 
35.6 bcm of piped gas and 6.2 bcm of LNG.
186
Additionally, as the other major emerging 
economies such as China, Brazil and India, the natural gas consumption in Turkey is also 
expected to rise considerably in the next 15 years.  
Currently, Russia and Turkey relations over the gas transit issue is more important for 
both sides also for Europe. Russia provides nearly 70 percent of Turkey’s natural gas imports, 
and Turkey can be an alternative route for Russian natural gas deliveries to Europe. For 
instance, huge amounts of Russian gas could be transported via the pipeline which is 
constructed under the Southern Corridor project, such as the TANAP. Accordingly, Russian 
gas will continue to supply Europe from a different direction. Instead of the South Stream 
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project, that is more expensive, Russia could transfer its supplies to the European market via 
Turkish pipeline connections.  
 
Table 3.2 : East- West Energy Corridor  
PIPELINE  ENERGY 
RESOURCES 
ORIGIN 
COUNTRY 
CURRENT 
CAPACITY 
EXISTING 
SYSTEM 
 
BAKU-
TBILISI-
CEYHAN 
 
 
OIL 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
 
1mb/d 
 
WORKING 
 
BAKU-
TBILISI-
ERZURUM 
 
 
 
 
GAS 
 
 
 
AZEBAIJAN 
 
 
 
7 bcm/y 
 
 
 
UNDER 
CONSTRUCTI
ON 
 
 
 
TURKMENIST
AN-IRAN-
TURKEY 
 
 
GAS 
 
TURKMENIST
AN 
 
13 bcm/y 
 
PLANNED 
 
AKTAU-
BAKU-
TBILISI-
CEYHAN 
 
 
OIL 
 
KAZAKISTAN 
 
1 mb/d 
 
PLANNED 
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IRAN-
TURKEY 
 
 
GAS 
 
IRAN 
 
10 bcm/y 
 
WORKING 
 
Table 3.3: North- South Energy Corridor 
PIPELINE ENERGY 
RESOURCES 
ORIGIN 
COUNTRY 
CURRENT 
CAPACITY 
EXISTING 
SYSTEM  
IRAQ-
TURKEY(CEYHAN) 
OIL IRAQ 1,6 mb/d WORKING 
RUSSIA-
TURKEY(BLUE 
STREAM) 
GAS RUSSIA 16 bcm/d WORKING 
IRAQ-TURKEY GAS IRAQ 10 bcm/y PLANNED 
RUSSIA-TURKEY-
ISRAEL 
GAS IRAQ 10 bcm/y PLANNED 
EGYPT-SYRIA-
TURKEY 
GAS EGYPT 12 bcm/y PLANNED 
QATAR-KUWAIT-
IRAQ-TURKEY 
GAS QATAR 20-30 bcm/y PLANNED 
S.ARABIA-
JORDAN-SYRIA-
TURKEY 
GAS S.ARABIA 10-20 bcm/y PLANNED 
 
Currently, the European Union is the world’s biggest gas import market; furthermore, 
it is the world’s fastest-growing energy market. It has a variety of energy import sources, 
however, it needs to diversify its supplies. At this point, Turkey’s role becomes extremely 
important because it is a natural corridor through a pipeline through which the EU market can 
access available resources. Currently, the EU receives large volumes of gas from three big 
sources, including are Russia, the North Sea, and North Africa. Therefore, Turkey’s main 
goal is to become a fourth main artery of Europe. 
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Map 3.1: Ongoing and future gas corridors development to Europe 
 
Source: OME
187
 
 
3.3.2. The EU’s gas balance to 2030 
The world population is increasing rapidly which cause significant rise in global 
natural gas consumption. The global population is thought to reach 8.5 billion until the year 
2035.
188
 Therefore, the global energy consumption will be expected to increase by 40 percent 
during 2009-2035.
189
 Parallel to global tendency, it is expected that total primary energy 
demand in the EU will rise from 25 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2035.
190
 Demand for 
energy resources in the EU will change dramatically in this period.  
 
Additionally, the energy import dependence ratio of EU members is expected to rise 
71% by 2030. The EU-30 is forecasted to coume nearly 700 bcm/y of gas by 2030. As a 
natural outcome, the International Energy Agency announced an incredible dependence on 
imports of the EU. For instance, Norway (considered as an import source) accounted for one 
quarter of EU imports in 2000 and is expected to keep its position also by 2030 with 17% of 
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aggregate imports of the EU. Nevertheless, this means that it would be more accurate to 
evaluate the EU’s supplies from Norway as a part of the EUs’ indigenous production cause in 
light of Norway’s EEA (European Economic Area) membership and its transformation of the 
EU’s gas directive into local legislation.  
Moreover, the text of the European Green Paper of 2002 alleges that Algeria and 
Russia are positioned on pole positions of external suppliers of gas to the EU, whereas 
Norway is seen as an internal supplier. Not only was this explored in the European Green 
Paper of 2002, but the IEA’s chief economist, Birol, also pointed the upwards push on EU’s 
imports by 2030 and listed it as follows  
•An extra 18 bcm from the Americas (mainly Trinidad & Tobago); 
•An extra 51 bcm from Central Asia; 
•An extra 79 bcm from Russia; 
•An extra 136 bcm from West and North Africa; 
•An extra 157 bcm from the Middle East 
This is an aggregate amount of 441 bcm/y and most possibly shows a small fall in the 
IEA’s anticipated import needs. Therefore the IEA has created the following evaluation 
concerning the spread of gas imports to the EU (especially EU-15) for 2000 and 2030. 
Table 3.4: Energy Import Dependence of EU Members and EU 30 Countries  
 1998 2010 2020 2030 
EU 49 54 62 71 
EU 30 36 42 51 60 
Source: The Green Paper, EU Commission, 2006 
Moreover, gas import dependence will increase rapidly. Gas will become the most 
important energy source for Europe in the next decades. IEA mentioned that the EU’s 
primary gas demand is expected to rise by 2,1 % between 2000-2030. As a result of this, gas 
import will rise rapidly and EU gas import dependence will increase by 69% in 2030.  
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Figure 3.5: Natural gas demand and the share of imports by region 
 
Source: WEO 2011. 
Turkey is seen by the EU as a potential import route, and correspondingly, Turkey 
views the EU as a market of gas transiting through Turkey. According to International 
Energy Agency (IEA), the EU’s main gas demand is expected to grow by 1.6% from 2010 to 
2030. It assumes that the EU’s demand will increase in all end-use sectors, especially in 
power generation. This case will try to define the EU profoundly, not only including the EU-
15, which comprises the 15 members of the Union prior to its enlargement on 1 May 2004 
but also the EU-30, which is also widely used in various other projections for the EU and 
includes all the current EU member states plus the three current candidate states of Romania, 
Bulgaria and Turkey and two other countries observing EU energy principles, such as 
Norway and Switzerland.  
3.4. Alternative Resources and Pipelines  
European Union has the high import dependence for natural gas which has already 
been mentioned above. As noted, Russia is the leading country with regards to natural gas 
exports to the EU. The EU has to diversify the sources in order to lessen the Russian 
dependency, so it is looking for alternative supplies. By this way, the EU can meet the energy 
security standards that are desired. Russia will always remain as a main supplier. Therefore, 
direct pipelines from Russia to the EU are stil planned, such as the Nord Stream and the 
South Stream Pipeline project. South Stream Pipeline project is designed to run under the 
Black Sea, and to reach firstly to the Bulgarian and Hungarian markets. However, the EU and 
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Turkey have other plans with regards to the Southern Gas Corridor project. Therefore, 
initially the South Stream project was not considered much by the EU and Turkish 
officials.
191
 Still, Turkey granted permission to build the South Stream pipeline which 
connects to the same markets as the Southern Gas Corridor on 25 December 2011. Then, the 
construction was planned to begin in 2012 and the project was thought to start operational in 
2015. However, no initiatives has been taken place so far. It is expected to carry 63 bcm/y of 
natural gas to Europe by two different legs:  firstly, Russia to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Austria, and Italy, and secondly Russia to Croatia, Macedonia, Greece, and 
Turkey.
192
 
Map 3.2: Gas export potential to Europe 
 
Source: OME
193
 
 
The EU has alternatives in order to diversify its resources. Other regions like the 
Caspian, North Africa, Middle East and Gulf are also significant suppliers. Moreover, there 
are also resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, in West Africa and in Arctic region which 
can be used in the near future. The region is really important for the EU since it is the primary 
region to supply the Southern Gas Corridor. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan are also the important markets in this region in terms of their natural gas 
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production. For instance, Azerbaijan is the first country that is about to enter the EU market 
with its gas being developed in Shah Deniz I and II fields. Additionally, the other countries in 
the region like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are only able to attain the European markets via 
Russian territories and involvement. 
Table 3.5: The Caspian region natural gas reserves, production, consumption and exports to 
the EU, 2011 
 
Furthermore, North Africa is relatively important region as an alternative resources. 
Especially, the Southern European countries prefer the region to buy certain volumes of 
natural gas in LNG form from North African supplies, such as Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. In 
short,  the North African supplies are a really important competitors against Russian supplies. 
Despite this fact, it should not be forgotten that the countries in this region are fragile states in 
terms their state relations and also, their political status are volatile and fragile. For instance, 
Libya is a good example for this situation. Actually, considering import flexibility, Libya is 
directly linked to Italy via the “Green Stream” pipeline. Recently, the “Arab Spring”,which 
started as a civil movement, gave a chance for “potential opportunity to increase natural gas 
production and export from these countries.”194 These countries like Libya and Egypt hand 
huge natural gas reserves; but, their national policies prevent the production from exporting. 
Similarly, Algeria is the largest exporter of natural gas in the North African region. 
Moreover, it is the third largest supplier to Europe following Russia and Norway.  
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Table 3.6: North African selected countries proven reserves, production, consumption, and 
exports to the EU, 2011 
 
Source: BP, 2012; Eurogas, 2011 and CRS. 
As the North Africa, the Middle East and Gulf region as a supplier are notorious too 
as a result of political unrest and unreliable pipeline security. It is known that many attacks 
have been recently made to Iraqi connections. Anyhow, Iran has the world’s second largest 
reserves, so it is highly attractive for the region, similarly for Europe. Likewise, Qatar is the 
other most significant country in this region for the EU. The country is sending LNG to 
Europe at significant amounts and nearly is accounting for 10 percent in total imports to the 
EU.
195
 
In addition to those regions, West Africa where the most signficant country is Nigeria 
due to its large reserves and exports, and the Eastern Mediterranean region involving Cyprus 
and Israel where natural gas developments have just started, can be alternatives for the EU. 
Lastly, Arctic region which is located at the north pole of the Earth, involving of the Arctic 
Ocean and parts of Russia, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Canada and the 
U.S. is not a new source for the EU. Norway and Russia are the two major natural gas 
producers in the Arctic. Despite accepting the Arctic as an alternative, if its resources can be 
achieved to use, the EU will again have a increasing dependence on Russian supplies. 
3.4.1. Transport and Geography 
This section addresses the Turkish role as a transit country by looking at Turkey’s 
closeness to gas producers that are more compatible to the question of EU energy security, 
and also, the issue that the EU can seek to derive and protect gas from another producer other 
than Russia. To understand these points, transportation methods of gas should be mentioned 
briefly. A pipeline is one method and a second one is liquefied natural gas,the method used 
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by is LNG. When Turkey and the EU case is talked about, pipelines are the most important 
issue for the energy security. However, their importance is essentially affected by the ability 
of the EU to increase LNG imports. Since, the direct pipeline systems serving the EU market 
is at the hand of Russia, and these do not include routes through Turkey. The EU can argue 
that routes through Turkey are expected to complement, not compete with Russian pipeline 
supplies. However, Turkey is very close to many other gas producers that can have interests 
when accessing European markets by means of pipelines through Turkey.  
European prospective demand for gas imports is increasing rapidly. Turkey, it is 
argued, is the key actor in the European energy security since it is adjacent or close to the 
countries that can meet much of the gas demand of Europe. It is estimated that at least 10 gas 
producers can have an interest in directing exports to Europe through Turkey, so Turkey is 
the most important energy gateway for Europe through which regional energy resources can 
enter. This is especially true in light of Turkey’s role as a gas transit way, more so than an oil 
transit way, given that Europe receives large volumes of gas from three sources: Russia, the 
North Sea and North Africa. In these conditions, Turkey will constitute the fourth artery of 
Europe’s energy supply in the near future. Its role is really critical as a natural corridor 
through which gas from a wide variety of supplies in an arc from the Caspian through the 
Middle East and the Gulf to Egypt can access the growing EU market with the use of 
pipelines. Therefore, Turkey has all the makings of key actor for Europe in the global energy 
system.   
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Table 3.7: The natural gas producers in Turkey’s neighborhood 
 
Source: BP, 2012 
Countries which are now being studied for delivery of their gas through Europe are 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Egypt. Moreover, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Quatar were 
also previously taken into consideration so they can again be included. Beside these, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan have a vested interest in adding their output to current networks 
developed to assist their neighbors’ exports. These ten countries have 55.34 tcm of gas 
reserves, which is nearly 35.5% of the world’s total reserves of 155.78 tcm.  
With respect to Russia, Turkey is essentially a competitor, especially where transit of 
energy sources is considered. Inspite of this fact, there is one major gas line from Russia to 
Turkey which can be assumed to have been built with at least a possible view to onward 
transfer of Russian gas to markets beyond Turkey. The line is the 16 bcm/y Blue Stream line 
under the Black Sea which was opened since 2002. In simple terms, it could be used to ship 
gas to markets everywhere in Europe.   
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In the mid of 2004, Gazprom had rejected to entertain such ideas, even though Turkey 
had repeatedly brought the issue into negotiations about the pricing of gas delivered through 
the line. Even so, Russia continued to suggest that the Blue Stream line be used to supply 
Israel with Russian gas via Turkey. 
3.5. The Reasons for Increasing Role of Turkey in Energy Security  
Turkey can become the EU’s fourth artery if it completes and implements various 
projects designed to bring gas to and transport from Turkey, and increase Turkey’s own 
throughput capacity. There are 5 potential gas pipelines whose capacity is 44 bcm/year but 
could be 102 bcm/year to transport gas through Turkey to Europe.  
Table 3.8: Potential gas suppliers to the EU supply potential as of 2010 
COUNTRY VOLUME TRANSIT COUNTRY POTENTIAL 
BY 2015 
EXISTING 
SYSTEM 
IRAN 10 bcm TURKEY 20-30 bcm 3- 10 bcm 
TURKMENISTAN 13 bcm IRAN/TURKEY 30 bcm 13 bcm 
TURKMENISTAN 34-80 bcm RUSSIA 80 bcm 50 bcm 
TURKMENISTAN 10-36 bcm RUSSIA/UKRAINE 36 bcm 36 bcm 
AZERBAIJAN 7 bcm TURKEY 20 bcm 6-20 bcm 
IRAQ 10 bcm TURKEY 10 bcm NONE 
EGYPT  4 bcm JORDAN/SYRIA/TURKEY 10-12 bcm Link to 
Jordan 
 
Beside these potential 5 pipelines, there are 6 other pipelines which can transport gas 
through Turkey to Europe post 2015. These are Qatar via Kuwait-Iraq- Turkey, Egypt via 
Jordan- Syria, Saudi Arabia via Jordan-Syria-Turkey, Kazakhstan via Azerbaijan- Turkey, 
Turkmenistan via Azerbaijan- Turkey, via Iran-Turkey, Uzbekistan via Turkmenistan-
Azerbaijan- Turkey.   
It can be said that there are 3 reasons why Turkey’s role in the European energy 
security has increased. The first one is natural gas becoming very important for both the 
world’s and Europe’s energy consumption. For example, in 1990 for 25 European Union 
states, the share of natural gas usage was 16,7%. In 2000, this number increased 22,8%. In 
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2007, it increased to more than 60% with the import of 300 billion cubic meter natural gas. 
According to 2006 European Commission data, it was estimated that in 2010 it would 
increase to 25,5%.  In 2020, it is thought that it will increase to 28,1%. 
196
 Although natural 
gas consumption is increasing, it should not be forgotten that oil also continues a large share 
in consumption.  
The increase of hares of natural gas in energy consumption created the need for new 
pipelines routes. Since then, natural gas is carried by pipelines, as opposed to oil. There is a 
trade of liquid gas but 70% of the world’s natural gas trade is done by pipelines. This number 
rises to 90% for Europe, so pipelines are vital for European energy security. As a result of 
this, Turkey becomes the best and critical alternative for European energy security.  
It can be mentioned that the energy need of Europe is increasing day by day but at the 
same time, there are new countries whose energy consumption is increasing too. In the past, 
these countries did not need this amount of energy; however, with fast growing populations, 
urbanization and industrialization, they must also enter the energy market. Today, the biggest 
energy importers of the world are not from Western Europe, but are instead from China, 
Japan, South Korea and India. What’s more, there are other countries increasing their energy 
import just as quickly. Especially within gas import, Asia is a very important player now. It 
should be noted that Asian countries make their import with LNG which is a way of gas 
transportation and it is more expensive than the pipeline method. 
197
Therefore, countries that 
preferred LNG methods, like Japan and China, have begun to turn towards pipelines. This 
means that Asia’s import of gas will be cheap and consistent but for Europe, the price in the 
market will increase. Moreover, newcomers mean that the share of market will be distributed 
to more partners.   
China and India are consuming more and this increase the pricing. Also, they try to 
find an alternative place in the market, and this leaves other importers in a difficult situation. 
For example, China set some rules when it traded with countries that have energy resources 
which hampered those countries from selling their resources to other countries. In these 
conditions, Europe should keep its imports consistent and find new resources and 
transportation ways which are reliable. As a result of this, Caspian Sea and Middle East 
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resources have become very important with their undiscovered reserves as the alternative 
resources. In the same way, natural gas and oil pipelines are very important tools for secure, 
permanent and reliable import of energy. The markets currently being explored are near 
Turkey. Therefore, the safest, the most economic and the shortest root for the pipelines to 
Europe take place in Turkey.  
The other reason that Turkey has a critical role in European energy security is the 
resource problem of Europe. The energy resources of Europe are bottoming out fast. Until 
quite recently, Europe provided its energy need from Russia, Middle East, and European 
countries like Norway and the UK. However, Norway and the UK have some problems about 
their natural gas and oil reserves because of the decreasing production. These countries’ 
consuming needs are increasing but their production capacities are decreasing and  their 
production has proven to be prohibitively expensive. For instance, the UK has been an energy 
exporter for a long time, whereas it has become a net importer for a couple of years. 
198
 The 
same is true for Norway. Many oil wells are closing because they are not financially feasible 
now. These facts make Europe more dependent on Russia and the Middle East. However, 
these two markets are not safe enough. Russia can use its power related to energy in political 
problems like Ukrainian case. In that case, Eastern European Countries had real problems 
providing heat for the homes of their citizens. Therefore, Europe must find alternative routes 
for balancing Russia. In this case, the strongest alternative for this situation is 
Turkey.
199
Especially given that in the Middle Eastern market, there are many inconsistent oil 
producers who have experienced transportation route problems. Therefore, pipelines are the 
best alternative for countries considering long term energy trade and again Turkey is the best 
alternative as a trade route.  
Turkey’s role on European energy security is not only about its geopolitical position. 
Turkey has increased its economic power in last few years. Moreover, it has significant 
experience with energy and energy transportation, its population power, and its stable 
political situation make Turkey’s location critical. It is very hard to find another country like 
Turkey because Turkey is a reliable and safe country. If the near future is examined, there 
have been some moves to establish pipelines in the region (Iraq, Syria, Urdun and Saudi 
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Arabia are some example countries) but these were not successful attempts. Nevertheless, 
Turkey is a country that succeeds in keeping pipelines working. For instance, the Iraq-Turkey 
pipeline (Kerkük-Yumurtalık) has been working for nearly 30years and its capacity is 
increasing.
200
Natural gas pipelines coming from Russia to Turkey over the Balkans have been 
working for 20 years and it has now joined to the Blue Stream Line.
201
 Both countries are 
working for the extension of these routes and for the creation of new pipelines. Additionally, 
there is an effort in order to transport Russian oil to Israel through Turkey and the 
Mediterranean. Besides these pipelines, the natural gas pipeline between Turkey and Iran was 
built and has carried natural gas to Turkey for 10 years.
202
 Among these pipelines, one of the 
most important one is the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that carries Azerbaijan oil to 
the Mediterranean. This is the most expensive and strategic pipeline of the last years. In 
addition to BTC, the natural gas pipeline was built between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The gas 
coming from here is not only sold to Turkey but also Greece. Turkey has not found these 
pipelines to be enough so it is working on new projects. These projects are not only supported 
and invested by the state, but private sector has the important role too.  
Turkey is aiming to add Kazakhstani oil to BTC and Turkish natural gas to the natural 
gas pipeline. However, there are some technical problems beside political problems. The 
biggest problem here is to the position of the Caspian Sea. For oil, this problem can be solved 
easily because Kazakhstani oil can be carried to BTC by sea transportation. On the other 
hand, for natural gas, this situation is harder to solve. Without any support from Western 
countries, building these new pipelines has proven extremely challenging. Therefore, Turkey 
has not limited its new projects with Caspian Sea but it has also considered Iran and Arabian 
countries routes.  
Turkey’s biggest pipeline project is surely Nabucco; which will enable that Caspian 
Sea energy resources be carried to Central Europe over Turkey. The signing of the Nabucco 
Agreement on July 13
th
, 2009 was the historical turning point for the European energy 
security and Turkey’s role in this process. Turkey as a transit country signed an agreement 
with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania for the transport of natural gas to the 
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European Union countries. This pipeline would protect the energy security of Turkey, 
southeast and central Europe. Therefore, Nabucco is precisely a European project. 
Considering all of the pipelines from energy producing countries, Turkey has a critical role 
and its role will increase with time, since these pipelines will pass through Turkey in order to 
reach energy consumers. What does that mean? This absolutely means that Turkey is going to 
become a core energy point for Europe in a very short time.  
Turkey wants to incorporate Iran and Iraq into this project. As a matter of fact, Turkey 
wants to include Gulf countries in this project too and it works for this. For example, Qatar is 
one of the countries that Turkey has worked on establishing close working relationships. Two 
countries made negotiations for gas import and construction of natural gas pipeline. 
203
 At 
first, Qatar did not lean towards Turkey’s proposal but then, Turkey convinced Qatar by 
mentioning that Qatar would be a part of European energy security. On August 2009, Seyh  
Hamad bin Halife el Thani and Tayyip Erdoğan met and el Thani indicated that both parts 
were eager to establish this cooperation. 
204
 Pipelines from Qatar are very important for 
Turkey since Qatar has the biggest gas production area and this will directly affect Turkey 
energy security and increase Turkey’s role in European energy security. Here, the biggest 
problem is that whether Saudi Arabia will allow safe conduct transitgiven that the relations 
between the two countries have not been good for a long time and Saudi Arabia was not very 
eager for the pipeline projects. If Saudi Arabia creates a problem, pipelines can go through 
Kuwait and Iraq and then reach Turkey. Actually, Saudi Arabia and Turkey relations are 
getting better so it can think about a Qatar pipeline project. If Saudi Arabia is persuaded, the 
Qatar-Turkey line will pass through Saudi Arabia to Urdun, then Syria, and finally to Turkey. 
The cost of the pipeline is estimated at 10 billion dollars. 
The most problematic country for pipelines going to Europe is Iran because of 
political problems. Despite this, Turkey works for Iran in order to include it in the pipeline 
projects. In this regard, Turkey understands that Nabucco will come to a deadlock without 
Iran. As it is known, there is a pipeline between Iran and Turkey and many cities of Turkey 
heat its homes with this gas. However, it is said that this gas is Turkish gas. Moreover, 
Turkey wants to transmit Iranian gas first to Turkey, then, to the world market. On October 
2009, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Iran and this visit caused an important 
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development. This related to Natural Gas Cooperation Agreement which was signed in 2007 
whereas it could not be actualized due to political and technical problems. With this visit, two 
countries signed a frame agreement in accordance with the previous one. 
205
  According to 
this agreement Turkey would work in the South Persian region that contained natural gas 
resources and 50T of natural gas taken from here would belong to Turkey, whether for 
internal purposes of for marketing to other countries. This problem had not been solved since 
2007, since Iran wanted that gas and would transfer to Europe only by transiting from 
Turkey. However, Turkey demanded the right to market gas. This four million cost project is 
very critical because if it becomes real Turkey would become an important energy corridor. 
This project would enable Iranian gas to go to Europe through Turkey and Turkish gas will 
come to Turkey through Iran. By this way, Turkey will provide the gas for Nabucco, which 
could potentially become a problem. As it is understood, Turkey wants this project for 
Nabucco and European markets. Therefore, problems about the agreement with Iran should 
be solved and when it is solved, Turkey’s role in European energy security will increase more 
than before. Moreover, these are not the only current projects, but there are others, such as 
Turkish natural gas and Kazak oil, pipeline projects between Turkey, Egypt and Syria. If all 
of them are realized, this would provide Turkey a big benefit in relation to Europe.  
Turkey has a good position in energy politics given its projects and developments. It 
is an ascendant power in the region due to its deliberative policies and moves. When the 
picture is analyzed, it is certain that Turkey is eager to construct new pipelines and expansion 
of the existent ones. Moreover, as a country, it has the power to realize its desires. Turkey 
monitored European export and import debit and began to create new projects in accordance 
with these debits. For that reason, it has become an important and a critical actor in European 
energy politics.  
Finally, the importance of Turkey in European energy security is also related to 
political reasons, unrelated to energy. For instance, it is a generally-held desire to keep Russia 
from becoming a hegemon on energy issues in the region, it is hope that Iran will be isolated 
and Western Europe wants to strengthen some countries by using energy leverage. Firstly, the 
USA gives importance on the containment of Russia and making Russia weaker. After the 
Cold War, the USA worked to decrease the Russian hegemony on Caucasus and Central 
Asia, and rendering those countries independent. Moreover, the EU held the same beliefs. On 
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the other hand, Russia uses energy (oil and natural gas) as a tool in order to control those 
regions and create a system similar to that of the Soviet Union. Some of those countries are 
dependent on Russia as an importer; some of them are dependent on Russia for selling their 
energy resources to the other countries. 
206
  Their energy lines go through Russian territory as 
a result of the ex-Soviet system. For example, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Armenia and 
Turkmenistan had exported their energy resources only by way of Russia. This situation gave 
Russia both political and economic advantages. In particular, oil and gas are the critical 
source of income for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan; so Russia holds great power and influence 
over these two countries. In order to cast aside this situation, the USA has tried to find a 
different energy route for Russia. By this way, those countries would not be dependent on 
Russia and become more uncommitted. For instance, BTC pipeline and the later constructed 
Azerbaijan pipeline have a big role on Azerbaijan because now, the country is not as 
dependent on Russia. If Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan follow the same path, this situation 
will affect regional policies. Due to this, Turkey will be the biggest partner of the USA and 
the EU. In order to regulate regional power balance and integrate Turkic Republics to Europe 
and the USA via energy, Turkey has a big role; and there is no other country in the same 
position as Turkey.  
In the same way, the USA has other policies regarding the Middle East, which affects 
the EU energy politics. As it is known, the USA occupied Iraq and this has made the country 
unstable. The USA seems to supports pipelines from this region passing through Turkey in 
order to get to Europe. Nonetheless, the USA uses energy resources as a tool to punish and 
isolate Iran. Like the USA, the EU also supports that Turkey should be close to the countries 
in the region except Iran, since in this way; alternative energy resources can be developed. 
Considering all of these political moves, Turkey again becomes an irreplaceable partner in 
the region for the USA and Europe. 
3.5.1. Pipelines in Turkey  
It is questioned whether Turkey can become the EU’s fourth artery, relying on the 
implementation of different projects which are designed to bring gas to Turkey, and then 
transport the gas from Turkey and increase the capacity of Turkey. This is undoubtedly what 
Turkey wants and Turkey has a major important pipeline that can be used to ferry gas to 
                                                          
206
 Adam N. Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy, Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecraft in Eurasia, 
(Albany: StateUniversity of New York, 2007). 
 89 
 
European markets beyond Turkey in a timely manner. It is the 20 bcm/Y capacity Tabriz- 
Erzurum line that opened in December 2001. It now carries Iranian gas to Ankara and other 
parts of Turkey. Moreover, along with BP, Statoil, and other developers of Azerbaijan’s big 
Shakh Deniz field, it has moved on to build the $ 1bn South Caucasus Gas Pipeline from 
Baku to a connection with its own East-West Main Trunk Pipeline at Erzurum. The Baku-
Erzurum line will firstly have a capacity around 7-8 bcm/y. Additionally, it is designed to 
expand up to 16 bcm/y. However, Turkey’s ability is in importing gas from its neighbors, 
especially considering subsequent transit of that gas to markets into Europe, and is not 
restricted to Iran and Azerbaijan in order to do so.   
There are currently 8 pipelines that operate throughout Turkey carrying oil and natural 
gas. In addition to these pipelines, there are pipelines which are in the construction phase, and 
are under projection.
207
 The most important pipelines could be listed as;  
3.5.1.1.Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline: It is the Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline, the largest one 
in Iraq. It is predicted that it will carry 1.6 mb/d but due to attacks and intervals it has not 
happened. It is 970 km long and it was commissioned in 1970. 
Map 3.3: Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline 
 
3.5.1.2. Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan(BTC) oil pipeline: The BTC pipeline was inaugurated in July 
13
th
, 2006. The aim of the project is to carry mainly Azeri oil but also other oil reserves in the 
region to Ceyhan. From Ceyhan, the Caspian oil will reach the world markets. The total 
length of the pipeline is 1.075 km and it is commissioned to carry 1mb/d.
208
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Map 3.4: BTC Oil Pipeline 
 
 
3.5.1.3. Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum(BTE) gas pipeline: The BTE pipeline is also known as the 
South Caucasus Pipeline. This pipeline runs parallel to the BTC pipeline but it carries 
Caspian gas extracted from the Shah Deniz field. It is 691 km long and at the moment it 
carries 8 bcm of gas but is expected to carry 20 bcm of gas by 2020.
209210
 
Map 3.5: Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
 
3.5.1.4. Blue Stream pipeline: This pipeline carries Russian gas under the Black Sea to the 
Turkish coast. It is 1.213 km long and it is expected to carry 16 bcm of gas from Beregovaya 
in Russia to Durusu terminal in Turkey. 
211
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Map 3.6: Blue Stream Pipeline 
 
3.5.1.5. Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (SCP): It is also known as the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, 
the SCP is not constructed yet, it is predicted to start in 2012. The main goal of the SCP is a 
crude oil pipeline intended to carry Mediterranean oil to the Black Sea region. It will be 550 
km length and at most it is expected to carry 1.5 mb/d.  
Map 3.7: Samsun – Ceyhan Pipeline 
 
3.5.1.6. Tabriz-Ankara pipeline: It is the one of the most controversial pipelines. It begins 
in Iran and carries Iranian gas to Turkey. It is very long,at 2.577 km. It has never reached full 
capacity due to several interruptions due to terrorist attacks but if it were to function at full 
capacity, it could carry 14 bcm of gas.  
3.5.1.7. Turkey-Greece pipeline (interconnector): This pipeline is 296 km long and it 
begins in Karacabey, Turkey to Komotini, Greece. The full capacity of the pipeline is 11 bcm 
of gas. This is a step in fulfilling Europe's target of diversification of the energy supplies 
because it does not carry Russian gas and does not bypass the Ukraine territory.  
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3.5.1.8. Arab gas pipeline: The Arab gas pipeline is 1.200 km long and it runs from the 
Jordanian-Syrian border to the Al Rayan gas gathering station in the area of Homs. That is to 
say it carries Egyptian gas to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. It operates in the Middle East. This 
pipeline is planned to connect to the Nabucco pipeline and Turkey will get 2-4 bcm of gas 
from this connection. On January 2008 an agreement was reached to build 63 km long 
pipeline from Aleppo to Kilis. This pipeline is also subject to terrorist attacks, hence it is not 
fully reliable.  
Map 3.8: Arab Gas Pipeline 
 
3.5.1.9. Nabucco Pipeline 
Nabucco is the biggest project that shows cases European energy security and 
diversification of the energy resources. The project puts into practicethe agreement signed in 
Ankara on 13 July 2009. This project supported by the USA and the EU will pass through 
Turkey and is composed of 3300 km long pipelines net.
212
 There are many associates in this 
project: BOTAŞ AŞ, Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD, MOL Plc, OMV Gas& Power GmbH, 
RWE AG and TRANSGAZ SA. It is estimated that this pipeline will begin from the borders 
of Georgia and Iran and finish at Austria (Baumgarten). The gas carried per year is predicted 
to be 31bcm and the cost of is estimated at 7.9 billion euro.  
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Map 3.8: The Nabucco Pipeline  
 
Nabucco’s 2009 Bucharest Declaration states the diversification of resources as the 
main aim of Nabucco. 
213
 Diversification of resources is important for the project because this 
way, the energy markets will become safer, transparent, predictable, and sustainable. If it 
works as thought, the project will be advantageous for producer, consumer and transit 
countries. Additionally, the project is compatible with the EU energy politics since the EU 
wants energy corridor to Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia.  
The project aims to take gas from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq 
and Egypt according to Nabucco’s operational director. The first problem with this goal is 
that whether the gas would fill the Azerbaijan’s pipelines or not cannot be estimated. 
Especially, if Turkmenistan gas is raised doubts, Azerbaijan gas will probably be below 
capacity. Nabucco operational director Reihard Mitschek (2009) states that  
“The construction will start 2010, and the first gas will carry in 2013. The amount of 
gas carried in 2013-2014 is about 8-10 billion cubic meters. This amount will increase 
step by step to 31 billion cubic meters. It means that in the short term, there no gas or 
investment expectation from Turkmenistan. Energy projects are long term projects, 
not short term ones. Therefore, we believe that we have good reasons to wait gas from 
Turkmenistan to Europe through Nabucco.” 214 
However, the Nabucco project is looking as fading away, due to the immediate 
reaction came from Azerbaijan which proposed the TANAP connection instead of Nabucco 
in which Turkey becomes the only partner with 20 percent share. The pipeline will be 
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designed to run directly from Baku to the Bulgarian border.
215
 How this gas will be carried to 
the rest of Europe from the Bulgarian border is not decided yet. Therefore, the future of 
Nabucco is now in difficulty.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Turkey is not a natural gas rich country, but it is situated in between energy producers 
who are holding crucial volumes of natural gas. As noted, world’s 71.8 percent of proven gas 
reserves and 72.7 percent of proven oil reserves are located around Turkey.
216
On the other 
side, the EU that is one of the biggest energy consumer in the world sitates in the west. 
Therefore, Turkey is expected to play the key role of an energy hub and a corridor between 
the supplier countries and the consumer countries.  
Turkey is well-situated for a potential transit country between the world’s major 
suppliers and the major consumers of natural gas. In addition, the curremt and potential 
pipelines mentioned in the previous section put Turkey in a really good place as an energy 
hub. Therefore, the EU and the U.S. support Turkey’s desire as becoming the “fourth artery” 
to the EU. Still, there are some challenges with regards to its important role. Due to its 
location as a bridge between Europe that has a rich consumer market and the major supplier 
countries, Turkey should know the interests of other countries in its periphery. Moreover, it 
must realize the strategies and the policies of those countries, then Turkey should form its 
own effective strategy based.  
To conclude, considering the geographical situation of Turkey, it is well situated for 
accommodating the pipeline connections from the East and South to the West. Turkey is one 
of the major developing economies in the world, so it looks like a reliable country for transit. 
3.7. Turkey’s role on Energy Security: An Added Value for Full Membership?  
The future of Turkey in the European Union has been intensely debated by both 
Europe and Turkey for a long time. It has been nearly 53years since Turkey applied for 
European Union membership, and the candidacy process is still going on. After Turkey 
applied to the EU, the EU continued to enlarge. In 2004 alone, it accepted 10 new members 
to the union. From this point, it looks as Turkey is excluded from the future of the EU. 
However, this is short-sighted, since Turkey is the only candidate country that has completed 
the Customs Union with the EU. Moreover, the geopolitical location of Turkey and the role 
of Turkey as an energy corridor for Europe should put Turkey at the top of the agenda. This 
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is only one of the concerns; Turkey would still act as an energy corridor for the EU without 
membership. 
Actually, integration of Turkish gas market to the EU would be an important topic in 
accession negotiations, since Turkey thinks that energy cooperation with the EU would be a 
contribution to the negotiations. Commission President Barosso stated “Turkey can in fact be 
something that is the interest of all European citizens: Good cooperation on energy 
matters.”217 From this statement, it can be argued that the EU may link the energy 
cooperation with membership. The European energy commissioner Günther Oettinger said in 
the “Quartet Meeting in İstanbul: “Turkey holds significant importance for Europe’s energy 
security due to its geographical positioning and regional roles. Looking at the map, we can 
see that Turkey plays a significant role in energy security.” He added that “We have talked on 
plans for increasing the inter-consecutiveness of Turkey with the countries in the region and 
Turkey’s neighbors to compensate the need in case of a problem in any other supplier.”218 
These kinds of strategies related to the energy cooperation bring mutual economic 
benefits to both sides. Therefore, opening of energy chapter to negotiations may bring an 
important momentum with regards to further alignment of EU internal gas market with 
Turkey. Actually, it should not be forgotten that Turkey is not only a transit way, but it’s also 
a gas terminal and an important part of EU internal gas market. Therefore, Turkey has a high 
demand growth potential structure, good supply geography, infrastructure and a transmission 
route. With regards to Turkey-EU cooperation, the establishment of the Trans-European 
Energy Networks is a good step in order to meet energy security. For future energy security 
and diversity of energy supplies, energy issues between Turkey and the EU become the top 
topic of EU-Turkey relations. Actually, this issue is directly related to EU external trade as 
well as foreign and security policy making, since energy is the internal framework of these 
policies. Moreover, these can be important energy policy tools to meet future security of 
supply. Turkey, in that sense, is a potential country to become an important player for oil and 
gas transit from Russia, the Caspian Sea region, and the Persian Gulf. With this role, Turkey 
gains strategic importance for the union. Moreover, Turkey also connects the EU with the 
Middle East and it currently holds the same role that the Mediterranean used to hold. For that 
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reason, political- strategic considerations play a critical part in Turkish future membership 
and closer relations with the EU.  
The weaknesses of EU external energy policy together with the Europe’s import 
dependency on Russia are the main challenges for EU policy makers. Russia wants to deepen 
this weakness through bilateral gas agreements with major European consuming countries 
such as Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium; if this addiction continues, Russia 
could strengthen its position further by imposing its conditions on future gas negotiations and 
keeping an EU common energy policy at bay. Turkey looks as if it strengthens its position as 
a new gas artery between resource-rich regions and Europe. Some oil and gas pipelines have 
already been finished and operate successfully whereas some of them are waiting to be 
finished. The important thing is that Turkey has been in ongoing negotiations with the EU for 
full membership and this can be an impetus for further and deeper cooperation between 
Turkey and the EU on energy matters. Moreover, recent reform process on gas and electricity 
sectors in Turkey is a point in Turkey’s favor and this situation signals that the Turkish 
energy market is on its way for integration with EU internal market. This development can be 
a great basis for Turkey’s aim to become an energy hub integrated within the EU market. 
These improvements are the starting point for any long term cooperation between Turkey and 
the EU, since a well- functioning energy market in Turkey would give the EU necessary 
reliable and liquid market conditions that also serve as a guarantee for energy security. 
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CONCLUSION 
Energy is an important subject for the EU. It makes the energy security vital for the 
Union. The EU’s energy consumption, specifically natural gas, is expected to increase, 
however the natural gas production levels are declining dramatically and the proven natural 
gas reserves in the EU are diminishing. The growing demand and decreasing production 
make the import volumes and import dependence of the EU rise. Oil and gas crisis showed 
the importance of energy security and supply security. The energy and supply security topics 
are more considered by the EU in several policy objectives. The EU wants the diversification 
of the suppliers and the supply routes as the most important steps to enhance its supply 
security. 
This thesis aimed to analyze European energy security starting from the European 
Coal and Steel Community to today and the role of Turkey in this issue whether it is critical 
for the EU. The conclusion to be drawn from this thesis on a general framework is that the 
role of Turkey in the European energy security is important; however it is not enough to 
guarantee Turkish membership, because the EU has an intergovernmental framework and 
member states’ preferences affect the EU decision mechanism. In the same way, concerns 
about energy issues vary among member states, so their national preferences are very 
important.  
In order to support this argument, firstly, the history of European energy security is 
focused on. In today’s international politics, energy security becomes critical, since the 
dependency on energy resources is increasing, but countries that have energy resources are 
very limited. One of these countries is Russia which also uses its energy resource advantages 
as a political instrument.  The EU is one of the main energy importers from Russia, so this 
issue is very critical for the EU too. Especially with the Eastern enlargement, relations with 
Russia gain new momentum. That is to say, European energy security becomes a very 
important concern for the Union. The Union does not have a common energy policy and 
because of the different perceptions of member states creating a common energy policy has 
proven difficult. However, the EU should take a common position on energy security, 
because this situation makes the Union more fragile.  
Secondly, the preferences of selected member states were mentioned in order to 
explain why the EU has had difficulty acting as a unified body in energy issue. In order to 
explain this clearly, intergovernmentalists theory was applied. Intergovernmentalism, which 
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is the state-centric perspective that can serve as a successful background to understand 
attitudes of member states. In the intergovernmentalist view, Moravcsik (1991) argued 
for‘intergovernmental institutionalism’, where he emphasized the role of domestic politics 
inthe changing interests of states. That is to say, concerning this theory, three big powers of 
the Union, Germany, France and the UK were studied first. Then, select Central 
EasternEuropean Countries were observed with the selected indicators, since their 
preferences could vary due to Russia and their Soviet history.  
Thirdly, the role of Turkey in the European Energy Security was analyzed, since this 
role is important for both the Union and Turkey. From the EU point of view, energy issue has 
some challenges because of security of supply problem and Russia. Instead, Turkey is like a 
dividing line between Russia and the EU, because its geographical location and historical ties 
with the other supplier countries are a benefit for the Union. Turkey has a crucial role as a 
gateway through which natural gas can be transported to the European Union. This role is 
becoming increasingly critical as the European Union faces the interrelated problems of 
ensuring energy security and the provision of energy supplies from multiple sources at 
competitive prices. Beside this, Turkey is a net energy importer itself and a major market for 
regional producers; Turkey has the ability and willingness to improve major transit systems 
for gas as well as oil, therefore its role starts to be important as a country enabling 
hydrocarbon resources to access European markets by pipeline from such diverse regions as 
the Caspian, Central Asia, the Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Considering the current and projected pipelines passing fromTurkey, Turkey has a 
critical role and its role will increase through the time, since these pipelines will pass through 
Turkey. Additionally, this role might increase the chance of Turley to become a member state 
of the EU. In other words this role can be an added value. The future of Turkey in the EU has 
been debated in both Europe and Turkey for a long time. It has been nearly 53years since 
Turkey applied for European Union membership, and the candidacy process still continues. 
The geopolitical location of Turkey and the role of Turkey as an energy corridor of Europe 
put Turkey at the top of the agenda. This is only one of the concerns; Turkey would still act 
as an energy corridor for the EU without membership. New improvements in Turkey can be 
the signal for the starting point for any long term cooperation between Turkey and the EU, 
since a well- functioning energy market in Turkey would give the EU the necessary reliable 
and liquid market conditions that also serve as a guarantee for energy security. 
About the future of European energy security it can be said that recent events and 
developments show that expectations are high and the EU needs to be clear about what it can 
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do with regard to energy policy and energy security. It always emphasized the importance of 
common action, so the Union has to find solutions to preserve energy security. As it is 
underlined above, especially energy dependency on Russia is a big problem for the Union 
and member states. The concerns became more prescient in light of past energy crises.  
Being one of the major emerging economies in the world, Turkey looks to be like a 
reliable country for transit. However, there are ofcourse several challenges undermining the 
viability of Turkey’s possible role of a transit country. For instance, the domestic demand is 
projected to rise at a considerable level in the future. In this respect, it is highly questionable 
whether there will be enough gas to transport to Europe if the current trends continue in 
Turkey. It can be said that it is hard to project Turkey’s long-term role as a transit state. It is 
dependent on many different external and internal factors. In short, Turkey now can be a 
transit country with the transition of Azeri gas until the Bulgarian border via the TANAP 
project. However, in the long term, when the projects are realized, the role will increase. 
Therefore, Turkey will keep its critical role as a transit country. 
Between these conflicted points, the EU must achieve to develop an effective toolbox 
to deal with the energy security. If it could succeed to deal with this issue, its future will be 
guaranteed in the energy security process. Turkey should use its advantages related to energy 
security, and it could become a key country for the EU if it uses this as an added value. 
Within the existing dynamics, while it is not yet a reality, there is a very real possibility that 
these goals could be realized. In order to achieve this, both sides should make some efforts 
and then, they can both benefit fully from their relations in the future.  
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